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Prices for pharmaceutical products over the last 10 years have skyrocketed, 
increasing far more rapidly than the general cost of living.  This article argues there 
should be greater competition for the production of follow-on drugs through the 
strengthening of the double patenting prohibition:  preventing extending exclusive rights 
beyond the original patent term by dressing up part of that invention as a new one.  This 
prohibition against the same party holding two patents covering the same composition 
announced by the Supreme Court in the 1800’s has been weakened by lower federal 
courts to (1) only considering the claims and not the rest of the specification in 
determining if the same invention is being claimed by the inventor in two patents and (2) 
only applying the prohibition when the earlier patent did not satisfy the technical 
meaning of “prior art” within §102 of the Patent Act.   The rulings weakening the double 
patenting doctrine have disregarded that the “invention” of a genus patent is not 
determined only by the claims, but also by the embodiments disclosed in the specification, 
and under Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent it must be presumed that the 
party with a genus patent has invented the full scope of the genus.  These weakening 
rulings have also disregarded that the double patenting doctrine arises from §101 of the 
patent statutes, rather than §§102 and 103, which the Federal Circuit models it double 
patenting test on, often incorrectly concluding there is no double patenting.  §§102 and 
103 serve different purposes than §101.  This article argues that when the same inventor 
holds a genus patent for a pharmaceutical product, it should be estopped from obtaining 
a patent on a species within the scope of the genus, whether or not the genus patent 
constitutes prior art.  Applying this strengthened double patenting doctrine would 
increase competition for the development of follow-on pharmaceutical products.
  




I. PATENT LAW SHOULD PROMOTE COMPETITION AMONG INVENTORS 
FOR FOLLOW-ON PRODUCTS ................................................................................ 326
A. Patent Law Balance ............................................................................................. 326
B. Additional Benefits to Pharmaceutical Manufacturers ....................................... 328
C. Competition for Follow-on Products .................................................................. 330
II. A PATENTEE SHOULD BE BOUND BY ITS OATH ........................................................ 336
A. Invention Claimed Cannot Exceed Disclosures in Specification ........................ 336
B. The Patented Invention is any Embodiment Disclosed in the Specification Within 
Scope of Claim ............................................................................................................ 339
C. The Presumption is that a Patentee Invented the Species Within the Scope of its 
Patented Genus Claim ................................................................................................. 346
D. Summary ............................................................................................................. 349
III. IT SHOULD BE PROHIBITED DOUBLE PATENTING FOR AN INVENTOR OR 
EMPLOYER TO APPLY FOR A PATENT FOR A SPECIES WITHIN SCOPE 
OF GENUS PATENT HELD BY SAME INVENTOR OR EMPLOYER ............................. 350
A. Supreme Court/Supreme Court Justice: One Person May Not Cover the Same 
Invention with Two Patents ........................................................................................ 350
B. Double Patenting in the Federal Circuit .............................................................. 355
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 355
2. Significance of “prior art” for double patenting .............................................. 357
3.  What person must hold the patents ................................................................. 358
4.  Federal Circuit has eviscerated and ruled inconsistently on double patenting 362
i) Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc. ......................................... 370
ii) AbbVie Inc. v. Mathilda and Terence Kennedy Institute of Rheumatology 
Trust .................................................................................................................... 373
IV. SUMMARY .............................................................................................................. 375
V. THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT INCREASES THE NEED IN SOME RESPECTS 
FOR A STRENGTHENED DOUBLE PATENTING DOCTRINE ...................................... 376
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 378
 
¶1  1850: Samuel Morse “could not take out a subsequent patent for a portion of his 
first invention [the telegraph], and thereby extend his monopoly beyond the period 
limited by law.”1 
¶2  1894: “[N]o patent can issue for an invention actually covered by a former patent, 
especially to the same patentee, although the terms of the claims may differ.”2 
 
1 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 114 (1853). 
2 Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 198 (1894). 





¶3  People who decry the rising prices of their medicines probably do not recognize 
one cause of that rise—a relatively obscure patent law doctrine called double patenting. 
The double patenting doctrine, which actually prohibits double patenting, should promote 
competition for improvements but has often failed. In a series of rulings, the Federal 
Circuit has weakened the double patenting doctrine and removed it from its historical 
Supreme Court roots. This has allowed pharmaceutical companies to obtain second 
patents for compositions covered by their earlier patents and to extend their exclusive 
rights in the applicable composition beyond the term permitted for a single patent. The 
Supreme Court can and should reinvigorate the double patenting doctrine as a prohibition 
on such second patents. This reinvigorated double patenting prohibition will promote 
innovation and competition for pharmaceuticals by third parties and limit price gouging 
resulting from unjustified extensions of patent rights. 
¶4  To put this in patent law terms, pharmaceutical companies have been obtaining 
broad U.S. patents that cover all compositions containing common elements, a genus, that 
sometimes includes millions of compositions.3 As a result, patentees have acquired what 
the U.S. Supreme Court has characterized as a right to “cripple competition”4 because a 
genus patent gives the holder (a “First Inventor” and the patent a “First Patent”) the right 
to exclude for 20 years any other company from making, using, selling or offering to sell 
any of those millions of embodiments (a “First Invention”). 5 These patents (1) hinder 
others from determining which species within the genus have the most promising medical 
 
3 JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 176 (Wolters Kluwer 4th ed. 2012) (“A genus is a grouping 
or category made up of multiple species that share some characteristic”); see, e.g., Sanofi-Synthelabo v. 
Apotex, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 353, 362–63 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 550 F.3d 107 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (the 
genus ‘596 patent covered several million compounds); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 
1280, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (the genus ‘416 patent “teaches a broad genus encompassing ‘approximately 
nine trillion compounds.’”). 
4 F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013) (“Patent holders have a ‘lawful right to 
exclude others from the market’. . . ; thus a patent ‘conveys the right to cripple competition.’”) (quoting 
FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1310 (2012)). 
5 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (post-AIA). Currently the patent term is measured from the earliest effective 
filing date of the patent application. Id. Due to the length of time a patent application takes to process, the 
average term of a utility patent from the date of its grant is “usually about 17 years.” Mueller, supra note 3, 
at 21. Under the Patent Act of 1861, the term of a patent was 17 years from the date of issuance of the 
patent. See Act of March 2, 1861, ch. 88, § 16, 12 Stat. 246, 249 (1861). As a result of the Uruguay Round 
Amendments Act (URAA) becoming effective on June 8, 1995, the term of a patent was changed from 17 
years from the date of issuance to 20 years from the earliest effective U.S. filing date. Emily A. Evans & 
Jill A. Jacobson, Double Patenting Recapitulated, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 625, 626 (2005). 
However, the expiration dates of patents issuing from related patent applications can still differ. See, e.g., 
Dennis Crouch, Does Obviousness Type Double Patenting Survive the AIA?, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 23, 2014), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/09/obviousness-patenting-survive.html [https://perma.cc/3MED-A9QG] 
(“First, the term of a patent may be adjusted or extended due to a variety of factors with the result that 
family member applications may have different expiry dates. The second source of potential term-
separation comes from the statutory definitions of prior art that excludes certain prior applicant disclosures 
from the scope of prior art.”). The term of a patent is also subject to a number of extensions, discussed in 
Part IIB infra.  
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properties6 and (2) prevent others from selling such species in competition with the 
patentee.7 The First Inventor commonly subsequently obtains a patent for a narrower 
composition for a promising commercial product (a “Follow-On Patent” or “Follow-On 
Product”) within the scope of the genus.8 This second patent can give the patentee 
exclusive rights to that narrower composition extending longer into the future than the 
genus patent did and giving the patentee the ability to keep prices above the marginal cost 
of production of that invention.9 
¶5  For instance, Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. received a patent in 1988 covering 
approximately nine trillion antipsychotic compounds that included aripiprazole and 
subsequently obtained a patent expressly claiming aripiprazole, which allowed Otsuka to 
extend its exclusive rights in aripiprazole from March 29, 2005 to April 2015.10 In 2001, 
AbbVie Inc. received a patent for a broad method of treating rheumatoid arthritis with 
methotrexate and an antibody, and in 2010 it received a patent for a narrower method—
within the scope of the original patent—of treating arthritis with methotextrate and an 
antibody, allowing AbbVie to extend its exclusive rights to the narrower method from 
2012 to 2018.11  A recent study showed that such subsequent patents added 6.3 to 7.4 
years of patent life to the original patent.12 
 
6 A “species claim” is a claim theoretically “covering only a single entity.” Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The
Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1168 (2008). 
However, in fact, all species claims cover more than one embodiment, where “essentially all patent 
claims—not just those defining chemical and biotechnological inventions—are genus claims.” Id. at 1169. 
As a result, the term species and genus are relative terms. In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 1014 (C.C.P.A. 
1964). There is a common law experimental use exemption, but the Federal Circuit narrowly construed that 
exemption in Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Mueller, supra note 3, at 535–36; 
ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS
846–47 (6th ed. 2013). In addition, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) provides that it is not an act of infringement to 
make a patented invention “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs . . . .” However, the 
scope of this regulatory use exemption and the use of patented compositions as research tools is unsettled 
after Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005), in which the Supreme Court 
expressly declined to express an opinion on whether § 271(e)(1) “exempts from infringement the use of 
‘research tools’ in the development of information for the regulatory process.” Id. at 205, n.7. There is 
“troubling evidence regarding delays or impediments to scientific research (with concerns appearing much 
more pronounced with respect to patented diagnostics) that result from patent licensing costs, licensing 
failures, or the chilling effects of uncertain potential liability.” Henrik Holzapfel and Joshua D. Sarnoff, A
Cross-Atlantic Dialog on Experimental Use and Research Tools, 48 IDEA 122, 144 (2008). 
7 See, e.g., Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 740 (Fed. Cir. 2013).  
8 See, e.g., Lisa L. Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take To Make A Drug - Follow-On 
Pharmaceutical Patents And University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 301 
(2010); and Michael Enzo Furrow, Pharmaceutical Patent Life-Cycle Management After KSR v. Teleflex, 
63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 275, 276 (2008). Terms other than “Follow-On” commonly used are “evergreening,” 
“secondary patents,” and “layering.” See, respectively, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in 
Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 348 (2007) [hereinafter Eisenberg]; N. 
Nicole Stakleff, A Drug Life: The Chemistry Of Patent And Regulatory Exclusivity For Pharmaceuticals, 
16 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 27, 54 (2014); Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching The Limits Of Intellectual Property 
Rights: Has The Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 IDEA 227, 248 (2001). 
9 Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 
989, 996 (1997).  
10 See infra notes 431–51 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 454–73 and accompanying text. Professor Love has pointed out that “in practice 
follow-on, or ‘secondary,’ pharmaceutical patents are often successfully challenged by generic drug 
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¶6  The high cost of patented pharmaceutical products has become a national issue,13 
and from 2006 to 2013, the price of brand name drugs “climbed about three times faster 
than the rate of inflation.”14 Subsequently, the Mayo Clinic and over 100 prominent 
oncologists published criticism of the high prices of cancer drugs.15 They noted, “In the 
United States, the average price of new cancer drugs increased 5- to 10- fold over 15 
years, to more than $100,000 per year in 2012.”16 They argued for “[r]eforming the 
patent system to make it more difficult to prolong product exclusivity unnecessarily 
(patent ‘evergreening’).”17 Similarly, the Henry J. Kaiser Foundation reported that “most 
Americans feel that drug costs are unreasonable (72 percent).”18 The AARP Policy 
Institute said, “The gap between brand name drug price increases and the rate of general 
inflation has been growing wider over the past few years.”19 
¶7  Yet higher prices have not resulted in increased innovation. Dr. Marcia Angell, 
M.D., the former Editor in Chief of The New England Journal of Medicine, wrote that 
 
companies.” Brian J. Love, Patent Duration, in 2 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Peter S. Menell & David L. Schwartz eds., Edward Elgar Publishing, 
forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2642927 [https://perma.cc/8JE5-
X5XN]. AbbVie’s species patent was successfully challenged on obviousness type double patenting (infra 
notes 454–73), but the success of some challengers does not comfort those challengers who were 
unsuccessful (e.g., infra notes 431–51 and accompanying text) or the patients who would have liked to 
obtain cheaper medicine. 
12 Amy Kapczynski, Chan Park & Bhaven Sampat, Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): 
An Empirical Analysis of “Secondary” Pharmaceutical Patents, PLOS ONE,
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0049470 [https://perma.cc/VG3A-VLQV]. 
This article addresses subsequent patents that fall within the scope of the original genus patents, not other 
combinations of patents, such as a composition patent and a subsequent patent for a method of using that 
composition and others discussed in the article by Kapczynski, Park and Sampat. 
13 See, e.g., Stephanie Armour, Lawmakers, Candidates Target High Drug  
Prices, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/lawmakers-candidates-target-high-drug-
prices-1447635567 [https://perma.cc/ZN4Y-JJZZ]. Some of the recent uproar about high prices for 
pharmaceutical products have not involved the price of patented drugs at all. See Andrew Pollack, Martin 
Shkreli’s Latest Plan to Sharply Raise Drug Price Prompts Outcry (Dec. 11, 2015), N. Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/12/business/martin-shkrelis-latest-plan-to-sharply-raise-drug-price-
prompts-outcry.html [https://perma.cc/HRF7-ULZL]. 
14 Daniel J. Kevles, Medicare, Medicaid, and Pharmaceuticals: The Price of Innovation, 15 YALE 
J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS (2015). See also Serena Lipski, Excessive Pricing And Pharmaceuticals: 
Why The Federal Patent Act Does Not Preempt State Regulation of Pharmaceutical Prices, 39 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 913, 924 (2008) (“In the more than two decades that have passed since the Hatch-Waxman Act, there 
have been dramatic price increases in the cost of pharmaceutical drugs.”). 
15 Andrew Pollack, Drug Prices Soar, Prompting Calls for Justification, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/business/drug-companies-pushed-from-far-and-wide-to-
explain-high-prices.html [https://perma.cc/KM39-UJSU]; Mayo Clinic, In Support of a Patient-Driven 
Initiative and Petition to Lower the High Price of Cancer Drugs, 
http://www.mayoclinicproceedings.org/article/S0025-6196(15)00430-9/fulltext [https://perma.cc/Q647-
6KX6] [hereinafter Mayo Clinic]. 
16 Mayo Clinic, supra note 15, at 2. 
17 Id. at 2–3. 
18 Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: August 2015, http://kff.org/health-costs/poll-finding/kaiser-health-
tracking-poll-august-2015/ [https://perma.cc/K6Z8-L3MT] (last visited Sept. 24, 2015). 
19 Stephen W. Schondelmeyer & Leigh Purvis, Rx Price Watch Report, November 2014, Trends In 
Retail Prices Of Brand Name Prescription Drugs Widely Used By Older Americans, 2006 to 2013, 16 
(2014), http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/ppi/2015/rx-price-watch-report-AARP-ppi-health-nov-
14.pdf [https://perma.cc/KA96-M4ST]. 
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“the pharmaceutical industry is not especially innovative” and added that from 1998 
through 2002, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved 415 new drugs, but 
only 14 percent were “truly innovative.”20 In 2012, the President’s Council of Advisors 
on Science and Technology said that “the pace of new therapeutic development has not 
kept up with the explosion in scientific knowledge” and observed, “The number of novel 
drugs has remained constant for several decades, even as R&D budgets have substantially 
increased.”21  In 2015 the FDA reported that “rising research and development (R&D) 
expenditures are not being matched by a proportionate discovery of innovative 
medicines.”22 
¶8  Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. said in a 1954 sermon that “if we are to make this a 
better world in which to live, we’ve got to go back. We’ve got to rediscover these 
precious values that we’ve left behind.”23  This article argues that the Federal Circuit 
needs to rediscover the still-valid principles and values expressed in Supreme Court 
decisions in the 1800s that an inventor “could not take out a subsequent patent for a 
portion of his first invention, and thereby extend his monopoly beyond the period limited 
by law”24 and that “no patent can issue for an invention actually covered by a former 
patent, especially to the same patentee, although the terms of the claims may differ.”25 
Similarly in 1896 in Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co.,26 the Supreme Court said, “It is 
self-evident that on the expiration of a patent the monopoly created by it ceases to exist, 
and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent becomes public property. 
It is upon this condition that the patent is granted.”27 These still-valid principles28 reflect 
this country’s “historical antipathy to monopoly.”29 
 
20 MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004). 
21 Exec. Office of the President, President’s Council of Advisors on Sci. & Tech., Report to the 
President on Propelling Innovation in Drug Discovery, Development, and Evaluation (Sept. 2012), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-fda-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2SS-
6BUJ]. 
22 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Targeted Drug Development: Why Are Many Diseases Lagging 
Behind?, 1 (July 2015), http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/ucm454955.htm 
[https://perma.cc/TS9J-8UEN]; cf. Joseph Walker, Patients Struggle With High Drug Prices, WALL ST. J. 
(Jan. 2, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/patients-struggle-with-high-drug-prices-1451557981 
[https://perma.cc/KGL9-TXMX] (“The Food and Drug Administration approved 41 new drugs in 2014, the 
most in nearly two decades. The catch is their cost.”). 
23 Martin Luther King, Jr., February 28, 1954: Rediscovering Lost Values, KING INST. ENCYCL., 
http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/documentsentry/doc_rediscovering_lost_values/index.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/2MDP-PE3X].   
24 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. at 114. 
25 Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. at 198. 
26 Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896). 
27Id. at 185. 
28 See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293–94 (2012) 
[hereinafter Mayo] (relying on Morse); AbbVie Inc. v. Mathilda & Terence Kennedy Inst. of 
Rheumatology Tr., 764 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (relying on Miller and quoting Singer as 
reaffirming the prohibition on double patenting, “It is self-evident that on the expiration of a patent the 
monopoly created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent 
becomes public property. It is upon this condition that the patent is granted.”) 
29 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitrom Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972). 
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¶9  This article argues that what the Federal Circuit calls the double patenting doctrine 
is an emaciated version of the balanced principles announced by the Supreme Court in 
the second half of the nineteenth century. Contrary to the current Federal Circuit 
standard, when an inventor or her employer30 receives a genus patent for a 
pharmaceutical composition, that inventor and her employer should not then obtain a 
subsequent patent for a composition of matter within the scope of the genus. Such grant 
extends the period of exclusive right in the composition of matter beyond that authorized 
by statute and is inconsistent with the representation the applicant made when she 
acquired the genus patent—that she had invented all compositions of matter within the 
genus.31 
¶10  In contrast, a third party who has not already received or applied for a patent for 
subject matter covered by the First Patent has not claimed to have invented the genus. 
The principles in Morse, Miller and Singer quoted above32 should not apply in the same 
way to a third party claiming subject matter within the scope of the First Patent granted to 
the First Inventor. There is no danger that the third party will extend exclusive rights 
(since he does not yet have any exclusive rights) beyond his existing patent term. The 
same principles also should not apply to the First Inventor if he applies for a patent 
covering subject matter not within the scope of his genus patent, because again there is no 
danger that he will extend exclusive rights he already has beyond the initial patent term. 
¶11  Part II discusses the U.S. patent law foundations of balancing the grant of exclusive 
rights with promoting competition and the additional statutory benefits already provided 
to pharmaceutical manufacturers. Part II argues that overly broad genus patents and 
Follow-On Patents to the First Inventor tip the balance by restricting third-party 
competition for improvements. 
¶12  Part III explains that the “invention” has never depended solely on what the skilled 
draftsman claimed,33 but took into account the invention disclosed in the specification of 
the patent application. Part III points out that this concept of invention remains true today 
and that the written description requirement of § 112 limits the scope of a genus patent to 
no more than the embodiments of the invention disclosed in the specification and 
includes each embodiment covered by a patent claim. Although the recent decisions 
discussed in this part indicate that many broad genus patents that were granted in the past 
would—if submitted today—be held invalid, that does not resolve how courts should 
react to applications by an inventor for a patent on a species within the scope of a genus 
patent that was granted to that inventor in the past or will be granted in the future. 
¶13  Part IV addresses that question and argues that the Federal Circuit has improperly 
limited double patenting by determining the inventions involved through comparison 
only of the patents’ claims and not of their specifications.34 Part IV argues that courts 
 
30 Pharmaceutical companies typically have agreements with their research scientists to assign any 
inventions the scientists develop to the pharmaceutical companies. See infra note 336. 
31 See 35 U.S.C. § 115; infra note 218 and accompanying text. 
32 See supra notes 1, 2, 26–27 and accompanying text. 
33 On a number of occasions the Supreme Court has cautioned against allowing patent eligibility to 
depend on the draftsman’s art. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359 (2014); Mayo; 
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978). 
34 Technically, the claims are part of and are found at the end of the specification. See 35 U.S.C. § 
112, ¶ 2 (pre-AIA); 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (post-AIA); Oskar Liivak, Finding Invention, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N A L  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R T Y  2 0 1 7  
 325 
should determine the “invention” in double patenting cases in the same way that 
“invention” is determined under § 112 and § 271(a): by determining the scope of 
embodiments of the claimed invention disclosed in the specification. It analyses 
inconsistent decisions by earlier courts and the Federal Circuit on double patenting under 
35 U.S.C. § 101.35 It argues that when a First Inventor36 obtains a genus patent, since that 
patent is presumed valid under 35 U.S.C. § 282,37 the First Inventor should not be able to 
obtain a subsequent patent on a species within the genus by arguing that the First 
Inventor had not really contemplated the scope of its genus invention at the time of the 
genus application. 
¶14  Part V discusses the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), which changes the 
definition of “prior art” for patents whose effective filing date is on or after March 16, 
2013.38 Part V points out that statutory exemptions from treating collaborative research as 
prior art —culminating with the passage of the AIA—increases the need for a strong 
double patenting prohibition as AIA litigation starts to predominate.39 
¶15  Part VI concludes that the double patenting prohibition urged in this article is an 
important tool for promoting competition in pharmaceutical products and consumer 
access to pharmaceutical products at reasonable prices.  Part VI also suggests additional 
research is needed to determine whether this article’s arguments about double patenting 
should similarly apply to anticipation arguments under § 102 when the genus patent is 
prior art to a subsequent species patent to the same inventor. 
 
REV. 57, 66 (2012) (“claim language is part of the specification”). For clarity, when this article refers to the 
specification, it means the part of the specification other than the claims. 
35 Compare Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2012) with AbbVie 
Inc. v. Mathilda & Terence Kennedy Inst. of Rheumatology Tr., 764 F. 3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
36 See discussion infra, Part IVB3, on the required relationship between the holders of the two 
patents, or a patent and patent application, for the double patenting prohibition to apply. 
37 The presumption requires clear and convincing evidence to rebut. See infra note 217. Under the 
AIA there are methods to challenge the validity of granted patents in administrative proceedings that only 
require a preponderance of the evidence to succeed. See. e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(e) (inter partes review), 
326(e) (post-grant proceedings). 
38 See § 3(n) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codifying scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) enacting and setting the date for new 35 U.S.C. §§ 100, 102 and 
103 to apply generally to “any application for patent, and to any patent issuing thereon, that contains or 
contained at any time . . . a claim to a claimed invention that has an effective filing date . . . that is on or 
after” March 16, 2013. Mueller, supra note 3, at 208, 233. Mueller writes, “A most unfortunate aspect of 
the AIA is that Congress entirely rewrote key statutory provisions of the Patent Act without renumbering 
many of the statutory sections in Title 35, U.S.C.” Id. at 234.  As a result, “U.S. Patent law will operate on 
a dual framework of pre- and post-AIA rules for at least 30 years following the AIA’s enactment.” Id. at 
173–74. To avoid confusion, and following one of Mueller’s recommended practices when this article is 
referring to § 101, § 102 or § 103, it provides after the citation “(pre-AIA)” when it is referring to situations 
in which pre-AIA law is applicable and “(post-AIA)” when it is referring to situations in which the AIA is 
applicable. Id. at 235. 
39 Professor Crouch reported on September 14, 2015, “Although there are no several thousand 
AIA patents issued, there have been no court cases yet involving an AIA patent or patent application.” 
Dennis Crouch, Implementing the AIA: First to File Patents, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 14, 2015), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/09/implementing-first-patents.html [https://perma.cc/6MCM-G4E8]. 
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I. PATENT LAW SHOULD PROMOTE COMPETITION AMONG INVENTORS FOR FOLLOW-ON 
PRODUCTS 
A. Patent Law Balance 
¶16  The U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to pass patent statutes to promote the 
progress of the “useful arts,”40 a reference to engineering, mechanics, and applied 
science.41 The Supreme Court has recognized that a patent is an “inducement . . . to bring 
forth new knowledge.”42 Scholars agree that patents provide a necessary incentive to 
invent, since otherwise “inventors would be unable to recoup . . . their research and 
development costs because third parties could simply copy the invention and compete 
with the inventor unencumbered by the need to recover fixed costs.”43 However, the fact 
that patent protection may be necessary to give companies the incentives to invest 
hundreds of millions of dollars44 does not determine the proper recipients or scope of the 
incentives. 
¶17  In addition to providing incentives, “one of the purposes of the patent system is to 
encourage dissemination of information concerning discoveries and inventions,”45 such 
as “disclosure of a process or device in sufficient detail to enable one skilled in the art to 
practice the invention once the period of the monopoly has expired.”46 The Supreme 
Court has explained, “The disclosure required by the Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of 
the right to exclude.’”47 Scholars have pointed out that the quid pro quo theory is in 
tension with the incentive theory, since disclosures encourage competition for 
improvements and weaken the incentives for the First Inventor.48 However, as discussed 
below, this tension reflects the need for patent law to reflect a balance between 
incentives, access to information, and competition. 
 
40 The U.S. Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power “To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, cl. 8 (capitalization in original). See EDWARD 
C. WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND 
ADMINISTRATION, 1793-1836 19 (1998). 
41 CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT – 
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 120 (2012) [hereinafter Bohannan/Hovenkamp]. 
42 Graham v. John Deere Company of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966). 
43 CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 33 (3d ed. 2014). 
44 DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 3 
(2009); see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 316 (2003) (“the strongest case for patents in something like their present 
form is said to be found in a subset of the drug industry.”); MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, 
AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 212 (2010) [hereinafter Boldrin/Levine] (“the best case for the 
existence of patents is in the pharmaceutical industry”). 
45 Brenner v. Manson, 86 S. Ct. 1033, 1041 (1966). 
46 Universal Oil Products Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944). 
47 J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (quoting 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)).   
48 Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 133–34 (Winter 2006) 
(“The quid pro quo view of the patent system, therefore, contemplates at least a limited form of free-riding; 
the competitor may be able to use the patent disclosure to create the incremental innovation at a lower cost 
than discovering the invention independently.”); Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? 
Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81 (2004). 
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¶18  The Supreme Court has cautioned that “in rewarding useful invention, the rights 
and welfare of the community must be fairly dealt with and effectually guarded.”49 The 
Court has also recognized the “restrictive effect of the limited patent monopoly”50 and 
has explained, “The inherent problem was to develop some means of weeding out those 
inventions which would not be disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a patent.”51 
The Supreme Court has concluded that patent “protection strikes a delicate balance 
between creating ‘incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery’ and 
‘imped[ing] the flow of information that might permit, indeed spur, invention.’”52 
Writing for a unanimous Court in 1989, Justice O’Connor said, “From their inception, the 
federal patent laws have embodied a careful balance between the need to promote 
innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are both 
necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.”53 
¶19  Scholars have similarly discussed the importance of balance in patent law.54 In their 
seminal article on patent scope, Professors Merges and Nelson pointed out that what 
constitutes an incentive for some, “such as extension of an initial patent to cover 
subsequently-developed versions of the invention,”55 may have the opposite effect on 
others. They concluded, “When a broad patent is granted or expanded via the doctrine of 
equivalents, its scope diminishes incentives for others to stay in the invention game, 
compared again with a patent whose claims are trimmed more closely to the inventor's 
actual results.”56 Genus patent claims57 are a choice of the patent applicant, and 
 
49 Sears and Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964). 
50 Graham, 383 U.S. at 11. 
51 Id.  
  52 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013) (quoting 
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012)). 
53 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (striking down a 
Florida statute that prohibited the use of a direct molding process to duplicate unpatented boat hulls); see
also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 569 (1973) (“Congress had balanced the need to encourage 
innovation and originality of invention against the need to insure competition in the sale of identical or 
substantially identical products.”). 
54 Not all scholars are in agreement. For instance, Professor Kitch, in his “prospect theory,” and 
other scholars have argued that “broad patent rights are beneficial because they encourage patent owners to 
explore, improve, and commercialize undeveloped areas of the inventive space fenced in by their claims.” 
Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REV. 379, 412 (Jan. 2012) [hereinafter 
Love/Interring]. Professor Love explains, “Prospect theory thus suggests that innovation is optimally 
incentivized when a single entity is vested early on with broad patent rights that allow it to control an entire 
technological field.” Id. at 414. However, the prospect theory seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court 
decisions in Morse (see infra notes 146–53 and accompanying text); Consolidated Electric (see infra note 
154–57 and accompanying text); Schriber-Schroth (see infra notes 158–61 and accompanying text); and 
with the Federal Circuit’s decision in Ariad (see infra notes 191–204 and accompanying text) tying the 
permitted scope of a claim to what the applicant disclosed in the specification. The Supreme Court has 
never adopted the prospect theory, and in Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1991), the Court held that a 
patent “is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion.” Id. at 536. 
55 Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 843 (1990) [hereinafter Merges/Nelson].  
56 Id. at 916. The doctrine of equivalents is a judge-made doctrine intended to prevent defendants 
from avoiding a finding of infringement if they make only insubstantial changes in a patented product. 
Mueller, supra note 3, at 468–69; see also infra notes 232–39 and accompanying text. For a discussion of 
the impact varying applications of the doctrine of equivalents can have on competition for improvements, 
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applicants can write claims that increase or narrow the scope of the exclusionary rights 
for the prospective patent application and their effect on others.58 
¶20  In weighing that balance, Professor Lemley has argued that patent laws can be 
justified “only to the extent that they do on balance encourage enough creation and 
dissemination of new works to offset those costs.”59 Professor Nichols has argued that 
“the social value of competition may outweigh the social value that can be achieved from 
a monopoly drug product alone…. We have a compelling social interest in promoting 
competition as well as innovation.”60 
¶21  The next section shows that Congress has provided—through statutes and grants —
huge incentives for pharmaceutical inventions, including extending the term of patents 
for commercial products, so that already the “incentive to extend the patent life of brand 
name drugs is overwhelming.”61 
B. Additional Benefits to Pharmaceutical Manufacturers62
¶22  The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 authorized universities to patent their discoveries 
resulting from federal funding, subject to certain rights of the Federal Government.63 The 
Bayh-Dole Act provides, among other things, that it is the “policy and objective of the 
Congress. . . to ensure that inventions made by nonprofit organizations and small 
business firms are used in a manner to promote free competition and enterprise.”64 
Professor Ouellette argues, “To justify granting these private patent rights for 
government-sponsored inventions, one cannot use the typical innovation incentive of 
patents, because academic researchers have been innovating long before the Bayh-Dole 
Act and are primarily motivated by a desire for prestige.”65 She concludes, “Bayh-Dole 
patents typically are justified under commercialization theory—the idea that companies 
need exclusive patent rights to bring an invention to market.”66 
 
see Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 
39–45 (2009). 
57 Supra notes 3 and 6. This article uses genus and species in their relative senses, so when 
referring to a species in this article, that species could in fact be a genus to some other smaller set of 
species.  
58 See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(“A skilled patent drafter, however, might fashion a claim to cover the metabolite in a way that avoids 
anticipation. For example, the metabolite may be claimed . . . as a pharmaceutical composition (e.g., with a 
pharmaceutically acceptable carrier). The patent drafter could also claim a method of administering the 
metabolite or the corresponding pharmaceutical composition.”). 
59 Lemley/Economics, supra note 9, at 997. 
60 Len M. Nichols, What Price Should We Pay for Specialty Drugs, Center for Health Policy 
Research and Ethics Issue Brief #3, 5 (May 15, 2015). 
61 Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching The Limits Of Intellectual Property Rights: Has The 
Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 IDEA 227, 232 (2001). 
62 The three sets of benefits discussed here are not the exclusive ones. For instance, the 1983 
Orphan Drug Act “includes certain tax incentives, clinical as well as R&D subsidies, fast-track approval, 
along with strong intellectual and marketing rights for products developed for treating rare conditions.” 
MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE 82 (2014). 
63 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212. 
64 35 U.S.C. § 200. 
65 Ouellette, supra note 8, at 307. 
66 Id. See also, Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
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¶23  The Federal Government has also provided significant funding and tax incentives 
for pharmaceutical research. For instance, the National Institute of Health (NIH) has 
provided the biotech sector $624 billion in research funding: “Through a system of nearly 
50,000 competitive grants, the NIH supports more than 325,000 researchers at over 3,000 
universities, medical schools, and other research institutions in every US state and 
throughout the world . . . traces of government support can also be seen in almost every 
single major biopharmaceutical product in the USA.”67 
¶24  In addition, through the adoption of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984 (commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act), 68 the federal 
government took affirmative steps to further the commercialization of pharmaceutical 
products. Hatch-Waxman allows: (1) generic manufacturers to test but not market their 
generic products while the patents for the patented products are still in force, (2) generic 
manufacturers to rely on the safety/efficacy studies the manufacturer of the patented 
product had provided to the FDA,69  and (3) manufacturers of new chemical entities five 
years of “data exclusivity” generally.70 
¶25  Under Hatch-Waxman, moreover, Congress has authorized the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) to administratively extend the term of a “patent which claims 
a product” if a number of conditions are satisfied.71 One condition is that the term of the 
patent must not have been previously extended under § 156(e)(1).72 As a result, “where a 
 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 621 (2008); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property 
Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U.L. REV. 77, 97–98 (1999).  
67 Mazzucato, supra note 62, at 60–61; see also Brian J. Love, Do University Patents Pay Off? 
Evidence from a Survey of University Inventors in Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, 16 YALE 
J.L. & TECH., 285, 287, n.1 (2014) (“about two-thirds of university research funding comes from the federal 
government”); William Lazonick, & Oner Tulum, US Biopharmaceutical Finance and the Sustainability of 
the Biotech Business Model, 40 RES. POL’Y  8–12 (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2257932. 
68 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). Professors Eisenberg and Crane have discussed in 
detail how the Hatch-Waxman Act intertwined the benefits of patent and FDA law and promoted the 
development of generic pharmaceuticals, while also giving benefits to patented pharmaceuticals. Rebecca 
S. Eisenberg & Daniel A. Crane, Patent Punting: How FDA and Antitrust Courts Undermine the Hatch-
Waxman Act to Avoid Dealing with Patents, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 197, 206–11 (2015). 
For additional discussions of the Hatch-Waxman Act, see Ouellette, supra note 8, at 304–06; and Furrow, 
supra note 8, at 284–87. 
69 MARTIN A. VOET, THE GENERIC CHALLENGE, UNDERSTANDING PATENTS, FDA AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT 111–12 (4th ed. 2013).  
70 Id. at 100; Vincent J. Roth, Will FDA Data Exclusivity Make Biologic Patents Passé?, 29 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 249, 261  (2013)( “Hatch-Wax provides a five year period of 
data exclusivity for new drugs.”); see also Brian J. Love, Patent Duration, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Peter S. Menell & David L. Schwartz eds., 
forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter Love/Duration] http://ssrn.com/abstract=2642927 (“for at least some new 
drugs, FDA approval occurs so long after patent filing that data exclusivity extends beyond the expiration 
of patent rights to the drug”). 
71 35 U.S.C. § 156(a). Patent term extension or restoration under § 156 bases the extension of the 
patent term on delays in the FDA regulatory process for approving a pharmaceutical product for marketing, 
whereas patent term adjustment under § 154 is based on delays of the USPTO in granting the initial patent. 
See Mueller, supra note 3, at 22–24. 
72 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(2). 
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patent covers more than one drug product, the patent could not be extended for a second 
drug product if the patent had already been extended for a first drug product.”73 Another 
condition is that the product in question must have been subject to a regulatory review by 
the FDA before its commercial marketing or use.74 The total extension can be no longer 
than five years, and the period of extension granted—together with the remaining term of 
the patent at the time of the extension—may not exceed fourteen years.75 
¶26  In short, the patent system and other federal laws provide significant, special 
incentives to the pharmaceutical industry not available to other industries. This is relevant 
background for considering whether there is the appropriate balance between First 
Inventors and other improvers for pharmaceutical products.76  The next section addresses 
how the courts have treated patents for improvements by parties unrelated to the First 
Inventor (in contrast to improvements by the First Inventor or employer of the First 
Inventor) and how that treatment can affect competition. 
C. Competition for Follow-on Products 
 
¶27  Since 1793, Congress has authorized the granting of a patent to whoever invents77 
“any new and useful machine, manufacture and composition of matter78 and “any 
improvement therein not before known or used . . . .” 79 There was no definition of 
 
73 Paul Burgess and John Lucas, Which Generic Drug Would You Want To Use? The Federal 
Circuit’s Interpretation Of ‘Active Ingredient,’ ‘Active Moiety’ And ‘Approved Product, 87 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 11, 14 (2005). 
74 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4). 
75 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(b) and 156(c)(3). Since its adoption, “the PTO has extended the lives of 
over 600 drug patents by an average of about 3.5 years. . . . In rare instances – seven times since 1980 – 
Congress has also simply bypassed both mechanisms entirely by passing private laws that extend the life of 
particular patents. . . .” Love/Duration, 4. There has been significant controversy over whether the patent 
term extension provisions of Hatch-Waxman have been applied appropriately. See, e.g., Kristin E. 
Behrendt, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Balancing Competing Interests or Survival of the Fittest?, 57 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 247 (2002); Paul Burgess & John Lucas, Which Generic Drug Would You Want to Use? The 
Federal Circuit’s Interpretation of ‘Active Ingredient,’ ‘Active Moiety’ and ‘Approved Product’, 87 J. PAT. 
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 11 (2005); Ann Kotze, Reining in Patent Term Extensions for Related 
Pharmaceutical Products Post-Photocure and Ortho-McNeil, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1419 (2012).  
76 Some think that on balance the system of patents for pharmaceutical products is not useful. 
Boldrin/Levine, supra note 44, at 238 (“To argue that the system could be fixed by eliminating patents on 
pharmaceuticals would be foolish . . . . Far from encouraging great new health and life-saving products, the 
system instead produces too much innovation and expense of the wrong kind—me-too drugs to get around 
the other guy’s patents.”) 
77 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS [hereinafter CHISUM], vol. 9 at app. 10-1. Section 101 
provides that whoever “invents or discovers a new and useful . . .” but the Supreme Court has held mere 
discoveries are not patentable. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2107, 2110 (2013) (“groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 
101 inquiry”). 
78 Under the Patent Act of 1790, the comparable words were “manufacture, engine, machine, or 
device” and the additional category of patentable subject matter was “art.” See CHISUM, supra note 77, at 
vol. 9, app. 9-1. “Art” was used instead of “process” until the Patent Act of 1952. Id. at vol. 9, app. 19-22. 
79 Id. at vol. 9, app. 10-1. Section 101 currently provides, “Whoever invents or discovers any new 
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”  
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“improvement” in the 1793 statute, and still is no statutory definition of improvement.80 
However, since § 101 ends with the statement, “subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title,” there is no implication in the statute that any inventor has a 
right to a patent for any improvement. 
¶28  In one sense, all patents are for improvements over what existed in prior art, so 
“improvement” is really a relative term referring chronologically to what came after some 
other invention and was related to that earlier invention.81 Since “the patent grant is a 
right to exclude, not an affirmative right to practice an invention,” there is no necessary 
inconsistency between granting a patent to one inventor for a First Invention and then 
granting a different party a patent for an improvement to the First Invention. 82  But if 
patents are granted for both, what are the relative rights of the two patent holders? 
¶29  Professor Duffy suggested a policy basis for treating First Inventors differently than 
other individuals trying to improve on a First Invention.83 He said that “the existence of 
the earlier patent affords the pioneer patentee a fairly strong incentive to develop 
improvements that increase the market for the technology.”84 He added, “This 
“consideration tends to suggest that the patentability standard should perhaps be more 
stringent, because the reward of the second patent may be unnecessary to encourage the 
pioneering patentee to develop the improvement.”85 
¶30  An additional reason for differentiating between First Inventors and unrelated third 
party improvers in the grant of patents for further improvements is that the First Inventor 
has already submitted an oath to the USPTO under §115 that he has invented the genus, 
which includes all species within the genus. In Odiorne v. Amesbury Nail Factory,86 
Justice Story said, the first patent could be “an estoppel to any future patent for the same 
invention” by the same inventor.87  In contrast, the unrelated third party improver has not 
submitted any such oath, so is not faced with an estoppel argument that he had already 
claimed he had invented the species within the genus. 
¶31  Professors Bohannon and Hovenkamp noted that there are at least three ways to 
address the rights of a First Inventor and a third party who invented an improvement to a 
 
80 See CHISUM, supra note 77, at vol. 9, app. 9-1; § 100 (pre-AIA); § 100 (post-AIA). 
81 Professor Collins writes, “Technological progress is a cumulative endeavor. The outputs of the 
work of earlier generations of inventors are inputs into the work of later generations of inventors. ” Kevin 
Emerson Collins, Getting into the ‘Spirit’ of Innovative Things: Looking to Complementary and Substitute 
Properties to Shape Patent Protection for Improvements, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1217, 1247 (Spring 
2011) [hereinafter Collins]. Professor Merges suggested that technically the only improvement claims are 
claims drafted as “Jepson” claims, saying, “Strictly speaking, only a patent drafted in Jepson format is an 
improvement patent.” Robert P. Merges, Brief Note on Blocking Patents and Reverse Equivalents: 
Biotechnology as an Example, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y, 878, 879, n.3 (1991) [hereinafter 
Merges/Blocking]. See also MPEP § 2929 III, § 608.01(m); 37 C.F.R. 1.75(e); and Merges/Duffy, supra 
note 6, at 32. However, Professor Merges and Duffy agree, “Improvements can also be drafted in the 
standard format.” Id.  
82 Merges/Blocking, supra note 81, at 879, n.2 (1991). 
83 John F. Duffy, A Timing Approach to Patentability, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 343 (2008). 
84 Id. at 365. 
85 Id. He cautioned, however, “The unique aspects of improvement patents seem sufficiently great 
as to demand more detailed treatment than can be accomplished in this article.” Id. at 366. 
86 18 F. Cas. 578, 2 Mason 28 (Cir. Ct. D. Mass. 1819). 
87 Id. at 579. 
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First Invention (the “Improver”), and those ways affect competition differently. 88 First, 
giving the First Inventor exclusive control over all improvements “would completely 
undermine anyone else’s incentives to improve the patented technology. It would also 
reduce the competitive pressure on the patentee to improve.”89 Second, giving the 
Improver exclusive rights to any improvement that independently met patentability 
requirements might initially give both the First Inventor and Improver “strong incentives 
to improve, but it might make the original patentee’s patent worthless if a market-shifting 
improvement were developed.”90 Third, permitting “the patentee to enforce its patent 
claims and the improver to enforce any independently patentable claims in its own 
patent” would create the possibility of “‘blocking’ patent claims,”91 in which the earlier 
patent is called the “dominant” patent and the improvement patent is called the 
“subservient” patent.92 
¶32  The third alternative above “is closest to the position the law has adopted” with 
respect to inventions held by different parties and “may come closest to a proper 
allocation of the incentive to develop further technology as between the primary and 
subsequent inventors.”93 Reflecting that balance of incentives and competition, § 2 of the 
Patent Act of 179394 provided: “any person, who shall have discovered an improvement 
in the principle of any machine . . . which shall have been patented, and shall have 
obtained a patent for such improvement, he shall not be at liberty to make, use or vend 
the original discovery, nor shall the first inventor be at liberty to use the 
improvement….”95  This § 2 clearly referred to the First Inventor and Improver as 
different individuals. Congress repealed this § 2 in the Patent Act of 1836,96 but since that 
repeal the Supreme Court issued three decisions97 on blocking patents between unrelated 
parties, essentially perpetuating judicially the statutory balance adopted in § 2. 
 
88 Bohannan/Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at 69. 
89 Id. (emphasis in original). 
90 Id. 
91 Id.  
92 Merges/Blocking, supra note 81, at 878–79, n.2 (1991). 
93 Bohannan/Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at 69–70.  
94 CHISUM, supra note 77, at vol. 9, app. 10. See also Charles W. Adams, Allocating Patent Rights 
Between Earlier and Later Inventions, 54 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 55, 65, n.45 (Fall 2009) [hereinafter Adams]. 
95 CHISUM, supra note 77, at vol. 9, app. 10-1 to 10-2. 
96 Act of Feb. 21, ch. 11, 2, 1 Stat. 318, 321, repealed by Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 20, 5 Stat. 
117, 125. See CHISUM, supra note 77, at vol. 9, app. 11-21, § 21; Adams, supra note 94, at 66. While § 2 
was still in effect, in Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356 (1822), the Supreme Court addressed a patent claim for 
an improvement Evans made in 1873 or 1874 to a machine used in the manufacture of flour called a 
Hopperboy. Id. at 357. Evans sued Eaton for infringement, and Eaton defended on the ground that the 
Hopperboy was in use prior to 1873, not on the ground of the existence of a blocking patent. Evans v. 
Eaton, 8 F.Cas. 856, 857–58 (Cir. Ct. D. Pa.). The Supreme Court said that a patent gives “any inventor of 
an improvement in the principle of any machine . . . an exclusive right to a patent for his improvement; but 
he is not to be at liberty to use the original discovery, not [sic] is the first inventor at liberty to use the 
improvement.” 20 U.S. at 429. The Court rejected the patent claim of Evans, because he was not entitled to 
a patent on the whole machine and he had not described his own improvement to only obtain a patent on 
the improvement. Id. at 430–32; see also Adams, supra note 94, at 65–66 
97 Adams, supra note 94, at 67 (“Besides Cochrane and Cantrell, the Supreme Court has dealt with 
the subject of blocking patents in one other case—Temco Electric Co. v. Apco Manufacturing Co.”). 
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¶33  In 1876, in the first of the three cases, Cochrane v. Deener,98 the defendants in a 
patent infringement suit defended in part on the existence of their own patents in the 
manufacture of flour,99 but the Supreme Court dismissed that defense. The Court said that 
the only consequence of a blocking patent was “that each inventor is precluded from 
using inventions made and patented prior to his own, except by license from the owners 
thereof. His invention and his patent are equally entitled to protection from infringement, 
as if they were independent of any connection with them.”100 
¶34  The second decision, decided in 1886, Cantrell v. Wallick 101 also did not involve 
the same party holding or applying for a patent on the First Invention and the 
Improvement. Instead, Cantrell involved a patent granted to Wallick for an improvement 
in an apparatus for enameling mouldings and a subsequent claim of infringement by 
Wallick against Cantrell.102 Robert Marcher had patented an earlier apparatus, and 
Cantrell defended on the ground that the Wallick patent was invalid because it embraced 
the Marcher patent. 103 The Court rejected that defense, saying, “Two patents may both be 
valid when the second is an improvement on the first, in which event, if the second 
includes the first, neither of the two patentees can lawfully use the invention of the other 
without the other’s consent.”104 
¶35  The third decision, Temco Electric Motor Co. v. APCO Mfg. Co., decided in 1928, 
involved a patent held by Temco (the Thomson patent) for a shock absorber for an 
automobile 105 and an improved shock absorber made by Apco under a subsequent patent 
issued to Storrie.106  Subsequent to its initial patent, Temco developed an improvement in 
the shock absorber and applied for a patent on that improvement, which led to an 
interference with the Storrie patent to determine who invented that improvement first.107 
Storrie, not Temco, was awarded the patent in the interference, so the Supreme Court did 
not address whether Temco could have been awarded a separate patent for the 
improvement to its earlier shock absorber. 108 The Supreme Court held, “It is well 
 
98 94 U.S. 780 (1876). 
99 Id. at 782 and 786–87. 
100 Id. at 787 (emphasis added). 
101 6 S. Ct. 970 (1886).  
102 Id. at 970–71. 
103 Id. at 972.  
104 Id. at 973. The Court added, “It is only the patentee of the original invention who has the right 
to complain of the use made of his invention.” Id.  
105 48 S. Ct. 170 (1928). 
106 Id. at 171–72. Temco sued Apco for infringement, and Apco defended on the ground of the 
Storrie patent, but the Court rejected that defense. Id. at 173. 
107 Id. at 172. The Supreme Court described the differences between the claimed inventions of 
Temco and Apco as “the substitution of the radius link for the metal guide and casing and hanger” and 
added, “Except for the radius link, there is no difference in operation and result.” Id. Interferences were the 
pre-AIA procedure for determining which of two competing patent claims for the same invention were 
given priority and awarded the patent under the first to invent priority system in place in the United States 
before the application of the AIA. Mueller, supra note 3, at 223–25. The AIA “eliminated interferences . . . 
but added a new derivation proceeding.” Id. at 220.  
108 48 S. Ct. at 172; Apco Mfg. Co. v. Temco Electric Motor Co., 11 F.2d 109 (5th Cir 1926) (“in 
an interference proceeding in the Patent Office priority of the conception of the radius link as a part of a 
shock absorber adapted to the Ford car was awarded to one Storrie . . .”). 
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established that an improver cannot appropriate the basic patent of another, and that the 
improver without a license is an infringer, and may be sued as such.”109 
¶36  None of the three decisions discussed above turned on the same person holding 
both patents, and Professor Adams has identified at least three types of improvements 
that could lead to blocking patents between unrelated parties.110  The first is “where the 
improvement to a prior invention consists of the combination of a component with the 
prior invention.”111 The second is if the First Inventor obtained a patent on composition 
XYZ, and the Improver subsequently obtained a patent for a new method of using 
composition XYZ.112 The third “is when an inventor makes a broad claim to an entire 
class (or genus) of products after producing only a single member of the class (or 
species).”113  An example of this third type is Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and 
Co.,114 which involved “genus claims encompassing the use of all substances that achieve 
the desired result of reducing the binding of NF-êB to NF-êB recognition sites.”115 
¶37  This third type of a blocking patent – a broad genus patent - can block a significant 
amount of competition for improvements by third parties.116 For instance, in Galderma
Laboratories. L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc.,117 the Shroot patents (held by Galderma)118 claimed “a 
general chemical formulation that ‘could result in hundreds, if not thousands of different 
compounds’ to treat a broad range of diseases,”119 and adapalene was within the range of 
alternatives of the Shroot patents.120 The Federal Circuit observed that the “now expired 
Shroot patents blocked the market entry of 0.3% adapalene products until their expiration 
in 2010, long after Galderma invented 0.3% adapalene compositions of the asserted 
 
109 Id. at 173. 
110 Adams, supra note 94, at 60–64. How to identify blocking patents as a practical matter is not 
always clear. See Ian Simmons, Patrick Lynch & Theodore H. Frank, ‘I Know It When I See It’: Defining 
and Demonstrating ‘Blocking Patents’,” 16-SUM ANTITRUST 48 (2002) (“What if the second item of 
intellectual property theoretically can be practiced without the first, but practicing the second alone would 
not be commercially viable?”). Of course, if the two patents are held by the same party, then there is no 
blocking, because the holder of one can choose not to exclude itself from practicing the other invention. 
111 Adams, supra note 94, at 60. 
112 Id. at 61–62 
113 Id. at 63–64 
114 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010), discussed in more detail in this article infra notes 191-204. 
115 Id. at 1340–41. 
116 Not only does the patent exclude any other person from making or selling the patented 
invention without permission, but, due to the narrow common law experimental use doctrine and limited 
statutory exemption under § 271(e), potential competitors are restricted in how they can experiment in 
trying to develop alternative products. Supra note 6. 
117 Galderma Labs. L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
118 See Br. of Pls.-Appellees, 2013 WL 1333337 at *13 (Fed. Cir.) (“The molecule adapalene was 
patented by Galderma in a series of patents (the ‘Shroot’ patents) that first issued in the late 1980s, 
including U.S. Patent Nos. 4,717,720 (A13024), 5,098,895 (A13036), and RE 34,440 . . . . These Shroot 
patents disclosed an enormous variety of different chemical compounds, different dosage forms, and 
different diseases that could be treated by the chemical compounds disclosed therein.”). 
119Galderma, 891 F. Supp. 2d at 603. In other cases, the genus patent has covered millions and 
even trillions of embodiments. See supra note 4. 
120 The Shroot patents disclosed “adapalene as the active ingredient, in concentrations of 0.001%, 
0.1% and 1%” and concentrations “preferably between 0.01 and 1 weight percent.” Galderma, 737 F.3d at 
735. See also Galderma, 891 F. Supp. 2d at 609.  
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claims. As such, no entity other than Galderma could have successfully brought . . . 0.3% 
to market prior to 2010.”121 
¶38  Scholars generally have agreed that such broad patents restrict competition for 
improvements.122 Professors Bohannon and Hovenkamp state, “If IP law prevents 
competition by granting rights that are too broad, it discourages competitors from 
building on existing ideas, works, and inventions.”123 They argue that people have “a 
reduced incentive [to innovate] as it becomes more costly to build on the ideas of 
others.”124 Professor Love similarly argued that even in the pharmaceutical and 
biomedical industries, “broad pioneer rights are unlikely to spur additional 
innovation.”125 He continued, “History further suggests that extending broad patent rights 
to early inventors in new fields will generally chill, if not entirely freeze, innovation for 
years at a time.”126  Professor Merges and Professor Nelson argued that generally “where 
a few organizations controlled the development of a technology, technical advance 
appeared sluggish.”127 They concluded, “Without extensively reducing the pioneer’s 
incentives, the law should attempt at the margin to favor a competitive environment for 
improvements, rather than an environment dominated by the pioneer firm.”128 
¶39  When a pharmaceutical company faces the argument that its Follow-On Patent 
constitutes improper double patenting, the company typically argues that the Follow-On 
Patent reflects a different invention than the First Invention and that the Follow-On 
Patent was not obvious at the time the company applied for a patent for the First 
Invention, disregarding the fact that the genus patent claimed the species disclosed by the 
Follow-On Patent.129 This should be a difficult argument for the First Improver to make, 
 
121 737 F.3d at 740. See also Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d at 1377. 
122 Professor Lemley has pointed out, “It is not enough to say that intellectual property law favors 
‘creators’—for here we have creators on both sides of the equation, and the law must choose between 
them.” Lemley/Economics, supra note 9, at 998. 
123 Bohannon/Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at 273.  
124 Id. at 6. 
125 Love/Interring, supra note 54, at 446. 
126 Id. at 457. 
127 Merges, supra note 55, at 908. 
128 Id. Innovations exhibiting “extraordinary technological advances” have often been referred to 
as “pioneer inventions.” Love, supra note 54, at 381–82. This article does not use the term “pioneer,” 
because the dividing line between a pioneer and an another improvement is not always clear. Instead, this 
article uses “First Invention” as a term to signify that the invention was invented before a subsequent 
invention, with the subsequent invention being an improvement. Historically, when a court found that a 
patent was a “pioneer,” it “customarily reward[ed] the inventor with a broad range of equivalents, thereby 
permitting her to claim ownership of technology lying substantially beyond the literal scope of her claims.”  
Id. at 389. However, the Federal Circuit has issued decisions on pioneer patents that seem to at least be in 
tension. Cf. Cohesive Tech., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“pioneering 
inventions often, by their very nature, result in broader application of the doctrine of equivalents”); Texas 
Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 846 F.2d 1369, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“even its ‘pioneer’ 
status does not change the way infringement is determined”). See also Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Doctrine of 
Equivalents and Claiming the Future after Festo, 14 FED. CIR. BAR J. 403 (2004). Since this article focuses 
on subsequent species claims within the literal scope of an earlier genus claim, there is no need to consider 
to what extent a pioneer patent should be given any leeway in determining equivalents. But see Love, supra 
note 54, at 379 (“the pioneer doctrine should now be excised from patent law once and for all.”).  
129See, e.g., Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280, 1290–91 (Fed. Cir. 2012); 
infra notes 431–51 and accompanying text. 
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in light of its oath or declaration that it had invented the genus130 and in light of the 
Federal Circuit’s decision in Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co.131 that an 
applicant can only obtain a patent for a genus when he had possessed the full scope of the 
invention at the time of the application.132 
¶40  Since what “invention” a patent covers is essential to applying the Miller principle 
that “no patent can issue for an invention actually covered by a former patent,”133 the next 
section examines the meaning of “invention” and the disclosure requirements for a genus 
patent. 
II. A PATENTEE SHOULD BE BOUND BY ITS OATH 
A. Invention Claimed Cannot Exceed Disclosures in Specification 
¶41  Ever since the first U.S. patent statute, an applicant for a patent has had to describe 
his invention.  Section 2 of that 1790 act provided that the inventor must submit “in 
writing . . . a description, accompanied with drafts or models . . . of the thing or things, by 
him or them invented or discovered . . . to distinguish the invention or discovery from 
other things before known and used…”134 Under the early patent statutes, “Patent claims 
were unknown,” and “the jury would determine infringement by determining whether the 
defendant’s machines . . . were ‘substantially, in their principles and mode of operation, 
like’ . . . the invention described in the patent specification. . .”135 The patent application 
described the preferred embodiment of the invention, which was “understood to 
encompass all equivalents.”136  Scholars label this practice of claiming as “central 
claiming.”137 
¶42  After 1822, the U.S. gradually138 switched from central claiming to “peripheral 
claiming.”139 In 1836, Congress required that the applicant for a patent “particularly 
 
130 Supra note 31 and accompanying text; infra note 218 and accompanying text. 
131 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).  
132 Infra notes 191–204 and accompanying text. 
133 Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 198 (1894). 
134 Section 2 of Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (April 10, 1790); CHISUM, supra note 
77, at vol. 9, app. 9-1. 
135 John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, 
2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 308 n.108, 309 (2002) (quoting Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1814)). 
136 Mueller, supra note 3, at 78. 
137 Id. at 78;  Love, supra note 54, at 389–91. For a detailed history of the transition from central 
claiming and the patenting of “principles” to a system of peripheral claiming, see Joshua D. Sarnoff, The
Historic and Modern Doctrines of Equivalents and Claiming the Future, Part I (1790-1870), 87 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE SOC’Y 371, 387–408 (2005). 
138 Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 734 (2009). It was 
only a general, gradual switch because the courts have continued to apply the doctrine of equivalents to 
patent claims, and the doctrine of equivalents is a vestige of central claiming. Id. at 735–38. Also, with 
means plus function claims, the claims do not provide the outer limits. Id. at 738. See also Dan L. Burk & 
Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
1743, 1771–77 (2009). 
139 Fromer, supra note 138, at 734. See also Mueller, supra note 3, at 78. Some say that “patent 
drafters began to break out of the text a distinct, separate statement of the novel features of the invention as 
a one sentence ‘claim,’ in order to avoid the possibility that the patent might be viewed as intended to claim 
everything in the full description of the invention.” Burk, supra note 138, at 1767. Others say the patent 
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specify and point out the part, improvement, or combination, which he claims as his own 
invention or discovery.”140 However, subsequently the Supreme Court still concluded that 
the scope of the patent would be determined “with due weight given to the patent’s 
written description of the invention and its underlying principles.”141 
¶43  The Patent Act of 1870142 mentioned “claim” twice, requiring a patent applicant to 
“particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination which 
he claims as his invention or discovery.”143 Although claims were initially used for 
purposes of determining validity of the application, “after some period of time, courts 
began employing claims in determining infringement as well.”144 The result of peripheral 
claiming was “for claim drafters to attempt to cover, by explicit claim language, every 
equivalent that a court might previously have recognized under the doctrine of 
equivalents.”145 Three Supreme Court decisions—one before and two after the Patent Act 
of 1870—established that the invention disclosed in the specification limited the scope of 
a broad patent claim. 
¶44  In 1853 in O’Reilly v. Morse,146 the Supreme Court upheld Professor Morse’s 
claims to the telegraph and elements of the telegraph, but ruled that his broader eighth 
claim was invalid.147 In that eighth claim, Morse said that “the essence of my invention” 
was “the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-
magnetism, however developed for marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or 
letters, at any distances, being a new application of that power ….”148 The Court said that 
Morse claimed “the exclusive right to every improvement where the motive power is the 
electric or galvanic current, and the result is the marking or printing intelligible 
characters, signs, or letters at a distance.”149 The Court held that the claim was too broad, 
because Morse claimed “an exclusive right to use a manner and process which he has not 
described and indeed had not invented, and therefore could not describe when he 
obtained his patent.”150 
 
claim “arose not from any administrative, judicial, or legislative requirement. Instead, it was an innovation 
of patent attorneys, and it was formulated to protect and to expand the rights of patentees.” Duffy, supra 
note 136, at 309. In any case, the claim distinguished the invention from things previously known and 
defined the invention in broad terms to make it more difficult for defendants to argue the products of the 
defendant were not equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 309–10 
140 Fromer, supra note 138 at 732 (quoting Patent Act of 1836 § 6, 5 Stat 117, 119); see also 
CHISUM, supra note 77, at vol. 9, app. 11. 
141 Fromer, supra note 138, at 733 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Winans v. 
Denmead, 56 U.S. 330 (1853)).  
142 CHISUM, supra note 77, at vol. 9, app. 14-6. 
143 Fromer, supra note 138, at 734 (quoting “An Act to Revise, Consolidate, and Amend the 
Statutes Relating to Patents and Copyrights” § 26, 16 Stat 198, 201 (1870)); see also CHISUM, supra note 
77, at vol. 9, app. 14. 
144 Burk, supra note 138, at 1769. 
145 Id. 
146 56 U.S. 62 (1853). 
147 Id. at 112. 
148 Id.  
149 Id.  
150 Id. at 113 (emphasis added). 
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¶45  In explaining its holding in Morse, the Supreme Court discussed a subsequent 
patent that Morse had obtained for an improvement of local circuits.151 The Court pointed 
out that if the eighth claim could be sustained, “his patent for the local circuits would be 
illegal and void. For he could not take out a subsequent patent for a portion of his first 
invention, and thereby extend his monopoly beyond the period limited by law.”152 In 
other words, the Court was saying, albeit in dicta, that an inventor could not obtain a 
patent on an improvement to a product he had earlier invented, if in fact the inventor’s 
original patent was broad enough that it covered the improvement.153 
 
¶46 In 1895, the Supreme Court decided an infringement suit filed by the Consolidated 
Electric Light Co. (based on a patent to Sawyer and Man) that nominally was against 
McKeesport Light Co., but the “real defendant was the Edison Electric Light 
Company.”154  The two broader claims were for incandescing conductors made of 
“carbonized fibrous or textile material,” and the narrower third claim was for an 
incandescing conductor made of carbonized paper, but it was admitted that the third 
claim was not infringed.”155 Expressing concern over the exclusive nature of broad 
patents, the Court said “the fact that paper happens to belong to the fibrous kingdom did 
not invest them [Sawyer and Man] with sovereignty over this entire kingdom, and 
thereby practically limit other experimenters to the domain of minerals.”156 
¶47 The Supreme Court rejected the two broader claims of Sawyer and Man in 
Consolidated Electric, saying, “If the patentees had discovered in fibrous and textile 
substances a quality common to them all, or to them generally, as distinguishing them 
from other materials, such as minerals, etc., and such quality or characteristic adapted 
them peculiarly to incandescent conductors, such claim might not be too broad.”157 In 
other words, since Sawyer and Mann had not invented species beyond the narrower third 
claim, the broader claims were invalid. 
¶48 In the twentieth century, in Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 158 the 
Supreme Court repeated this basic limitation on patent claim scope in a case involving 
 
151 Morse obtained his patent for the telegraph in 1840, and that patent was reissued in 1848. Id. at 
106. The patent for the improvement of local circuits was issued in 1846 and reissued in 1848. Id.  
152 Id. at 114. 
153 Of course, the fact a Supreme Court statement was dicta does not mean it is unimportant. The 
Federal Circuit has recognized that subordinate federal courts “are bound to follow them.” Ariad Pharm., 
Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citing Stone Container Corp. v. 
U.S., 229 F.3d 1345, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). See also Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 
F.3d 1282, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Dyk, J., concurring in denial of petition for rehearing en banc). The 
Supreme Court has subsequently cited Morse favorably in many decisions. See, e.g., Dolbear v. Am. Bell 
Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1, 534 (1888) (“The effect of that decision was, therefore, that the use of magnetism as a 
motive power, without regard to the particular process with which it was connected in the patent, could not 
be claimed, but that its use in that connection could.”); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972); 
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).  
154 Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S. 465 (1895). The Court noted that 
“the case involved a contest between what are known as the Sawyer and Man and the Edison systems of 
electric lighting.” 
155 Id. at 468, 472. 
156 Id. at 476. 
157 Id. at 472. 
158 305 U.S. 47 (1938). 
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patent claims for automobile pistons.159 The Court reversed the holding of the Sixth 
Circuit that the patents were valid160 and said that “the patent monopoly does not extend 
beyond the invention described . . . it cannot be enlarged by claims in the patent not 
supported by the description.”161 
¶49 In other words, even with peripheral claiming, the Supreme Court made clear that if 
a patent claim was broader in scope than the invention described in the specification, that 
claim was invalid.  There was no change as a result of the Patent Act of 1952, discussed 
next. 
B. The Patented Invention is any Embodiment Disclosed in the Specification Within 
Scope of Claim162
 
¶50 The Patent Act of 1952 “was intended to recodify, clarify, and revise the 1870 
Patent Act’s provisions,” but its “legislative history confirms that no relevant substantive 
amendments were intended by the changes to the language of Section 112.”163 Section 
112 (pre-AIA) set forth the requirements for describing an invention in a patent 
application as follows: 
 
“The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and 
of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which 
it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the 
same….”; and
 
“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly 
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor 
or a joint inventor regards as the invention . . . . ”164 
  
 
159 Id. at 49. Mueller points out that “the Court in Schriber-Schroth ‘did not expressly state’ that it 
was applying a written description requirement separate from enablement,” but “the Ariad court concluded 
that ‘that is exactly what the Court did.” Mueller, supra note 3, at 165–66 (citing Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1346). 
160 Cleveland Trust Co. v. Schriber-Schroth Co., 92 F.2d 330, 338 (6th Cir. 1937). 
161 305 U.S. at 57 (emphasis added). 
162 Professor Liivak explained that “no matter how broadly you might have invented, only the 
embodiments that are claimed will need to comply with the validity portions of the patent statute [§§ 101, 
102, 103 and 112] and only the claimed embodiments can be infringed.” Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the 
Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 31 (2013). However, that disclosure does 
not require identification of all the precise chemical structures of each embodiment. See infra notes 202–03 
and 213–14 and accompanying text. 
163 Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern Doctrines of Equivalents and Claiming the 
Future: Part II (1870-1952), 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y, 441, 482, 485 (2005). Professor 
Sarnoff also pointed out that in its limited approval of functional claiming in § 112, ¶6, “Congress was 
careful to preserve the pre-existing limits on overbroad claiming . . . .” Id. at 486.  
164 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶¶ 1 and 2. Both pre-AIA and post-AIA § 112 contain the clause, “and shall 
set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.” 
However, as a result of the AIA, 35 U.S.C. § 282 (b)(3)(A) now provides, “the failure to disclose the best 
mode shall not be a basis on which any claim of a patent may be canceled or held invalid or otherwise 
unenforceable . . . .” 
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¶51 The applicable Senate Report on these two clauses in the 1952 Patent Act said, 
“[t]he clause relating to the claim is made a separate paragraph to emphasize the 
distinction between the description and the claim or definition, and the language is 
modified.”165 Section 112 (post-AIA) has substantially the same provisions for disclosure 
as § 112 (pre-AIA).166 
¶52 The first paragraph of § 112 provides that the “specification shall contain a written
description of the invention.” In Morse, Consolidated Electric and Schriber-Schroth, with 
similar statutory disclosure requirements,167 the Supreme Court concluded that since the 
specification did not disclose the scope of what was claimed, the applicable patent claims 
were not valid.  In other words, “courts must go beyond the claims to determine what the 
‘inventors actually invented.”168 
¶53 The second paragraph of § 112 mentions “invention,” but simply requires the claim 
to reveal what the inventor “regards as the invention.”169 In Morse and Consolidated
Electric, the inventors regarded their inventions as much broader in scope than the 
Supreme Court did, but the Court said the actual invention was narrower, as the 
specification disclosed. 170 Indeed, § 100(a)(post-AIA) provides, “The term ‘invention’ 
means invention or discovery,” and § 100(j)(post-AIA) provides, “The term ‘claimed 
invention’ means the subject matter defined by a claim in a patent or an application for a 
patent.” The “claimed invention” can be narrower than the invention disclosed in the 
specification, but cannot be broader for patent protection.171 
 
165 S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 2412 (1952). Before the Patent Act of 1952, the courts had used the 
word “invention” to refer to (a) what the inventor had created and also (b) as a “qualitative measure of 
patentability for new inventions” that Judge Rich referred to as “judicial legislation.” See Judge Giles S. 
Rich, Laying The Ghost Of The ‘Invention’ Requirement, 41 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 29 (2013). The Patent Act of 
1952 created a statutory obviousness requirement in § 103 as a substitute for this “judicial legislation” but 
retained the requirement in § 112 that the applicant in fact disclose her invention in the patent application. 
Id. at 15–18. For detailed discussions of the obviousness requirement, see Douglas L. Rogers, Obvious
Confusion Over Properties Discovered After a Patent Application, 43 AIPLA Q.J. 489 (2015) and Douglas 
L. Rogers, Federal Circuit’s Obviousness Test For New Pharmaceutical Compounds: Gobbledygook? 14 
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 49 (2015). 
166 “(a) In General.—The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of 
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any 
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the 
same . . . . (b) Conclusion.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing 
out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the 
invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).  
167 See CHISUM, supra note 77, at vol. 3A, § 7.02[1]-[4], 7-9 to -12. 
168 Christopher A. Cotropia, What Is The “Invention”?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1855, 1879 
(2012) (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) & Renishaw PLC 
v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
169 In addition to adding letter designations to the paragraphs of § 112 (pre-AIA), § 112 (post-
AIA) added “or joint inventor,” and § 282(b)(3)(A) ()(post-AIA) limited the consequences of failing to 
meet the best mode requirement of § 112 (post-AIA). See infra note 184. However, the requirements for 
written description, enablement and definiteness remained essentially the same from § 112 (pre-AIA) to § 
112 (post-AIA).). See CHISUM, supra note 167, at vol. 3, § 7.02[1]–[5], app. 7-9 to 7-14.1. 
170 See supra notes 167 and accompanying text. 
171 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 157–60 (2006); cf. 
Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction in Patent Law, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1097, 1102–03 (2011) (“The 
specification describes the invention created by the patentee so that others can make and use it . . . a claim 
describes only the key inventive features of the invention—those that form the essence of the patentee’s 
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¶54 The text of §101 supports the position that “invention” refers to embodiments, 
because it provides, “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement” of any of 
those categories, is entitled to a patent if the other requirements of the patent statute are 
satisfied.172 Machines, manufactures compositions of matter “are real things, as opposed 
to metaphysical constructs or abstractions. These things are real in the sense that invented
things are either physical objects (machines, manufactures, compositions of matter) or 
they are specific physical acts (processes and methods).”173 In In re Nuijten, the Federal 
Circuit addressed a patent claim for a signal with embedded digital watermark encoded 
according to a given encoding process.174 The Federal Circuit said the claimed invention 
was “not a ‘process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter’ . . . thus, such a 
signal cannot be patentable subject matter.”175 In other words, “inventors invent operable 
embodiments.”176 
¶55 The Supreme Court has recognized that an invention exists before the claim is 
filed. In Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,177 the inventor Pfaff had submitted drawings of 
his invention to Wells Electronics, and Wells had provided Pfaff with a written 
confirmation of a previous oral purchase order for the computer chip socket in question, 
all more than a year before Well’s patent application.178 Of course, there was no patent 
claim filed at the critical time: one year prior to the patent application under § 102(b).  
The Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s finding that the Pfaff patent was “invalid 
because the invention had been on sale for more than one year in this country before he 
filed his patent application.”179 In other words, “the subject matter invented by the 
inventor exist[ed] before a patent is ever filed and before any claims have been 
written.”180 
¶56 The Supreme Court has also held that under § 271(a), a defendant has made the 
“patented invention” only when it has completed the “operable assembly of the whole 
 
idea.”). If the specification discloses a broader invention than claimed, then generally the broader part 
disclosed in the specification that is not claimed is deemed to be disclaimed and free for the public to use. 
See Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc. v. R.E. Service Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en 
banc). 
172 There was no change in § 101 as the result of the AIA. 35 U.S.C. § 101.  
173 Liivak, supra note 34, at 68–69. 
174 500 F.3d 1346, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
175 Id. at 1356. As a result, the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interferences concluding the patent claim did not reflect patentable subject matter.  
176 Liivak, supra note 34, at 68.  
177 525 U.S. 55 (1998). 
178 Id. at 57–58. Section 102(b) ()(pre-AIA) provided that an inventor did not have the right to a 
patent if the “invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in 
public use of on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the 
United States.” 
179 Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 68–69. However, for cases to which the AIA will apply, “the invention date . 
. . is no longer relevant to determining which of two rival claimants for a patent will prevail.” Mueller, 
supra note 3, at 22, n.54. The “AIA generally awards the patent to the first inventor to file her patent 
application,” but “a second (i.e., later in time) filer will obtain the patent if the second filer had publicly 
disclosed the invention before the first filer’s effective filing date and thereafter files her own (i.e., the 
second filer’s) application in a timely fashion.” Id. at 233, n.208. 
180 Liivak, supra note 162, at 16. 
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and not the manufacture of its parts” in the United States.181 The Court added that a 
“patent covers only the totality of the elements in the claim and . . . no element, separately 
viewed, is within the grant.’”182  In other words, if Patent X claims a product 
“comprising” A, B and C, then patent X covers both a constructed product composed of 
A, B, C and D and a constructed product composed of A, B, C and E.183 
¶57 There are a number of disclosure requirements in §112, including: (1) enablement 
and (2) written description of the invention.184 The “enablement requirement is satisfied 
when one skilled in the art, after reading the specification, could practice the claimed 
invention without undue experimentation.”185 The written description requirement, 
discussed next, has been more controversial.186 
¶58 Initially, the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), a predecessor 
court to the Federal Circuit,187 conflated the written description requirement with the 
 
181 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 528 (1972). Deepsouth involved 
patents held by Laitram for deveining shrimp and whether Deepsouth infringed those patents by making 
and shipping to foreign customers all the parts for the deveining machines. Id. at 523–24. The Supreme 
Court held there was no infringement because the patented product had not been completed in the United 
States. Id. 525–26, 532.  After Deepsouth, Congress amended § 271 to add § 271(f)(1) stating that whoever 
“without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial portion 
of the components of a patented invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in 
such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the United States in a 
manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable 
as an infringer.” See Mueller, supra note 3, at 512–17. In Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 
444–45 (2007), the Supreme Court explained that 271(f) “expands the definition of infringement to include 
supplying from the United States a patented invention’s components.”  However, § 271(a) still refers to the 
“patented invention.” 
182 Deepsouth Packing Co., 406 U.S. at 528 (emphasis added) (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. 
Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 344 (1961)).  
183 “Comprising” is an “open” claim term, and “consisting of” is a “closed” claim term. Professors 
Merges and Duffy write, “If the claim reads ‘an invention comprising elements A, B and C,’ long tradition 
in the patent field dictates that the claim covers any embodiment of the invention having elements A, B and 
C and any additional elements.” Merges, supra note 6, at 28 (emphasis in original). In contrast, “[i]“f you 
claim ‘An invention consisting of elements A, B and C,’ someone selling a variant that also incorporates 
element D does not infringe your claim.” Id. See also infra notes 405–11 and accompanying text for 
discussion of In re Schneller, 397 F.2d 350 (C.C.P.A. 1968). 
184 See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text. Of course, both are satisfied through writing in 
the application. Omitted from the text accompanying note 164 is the requirement that an applicant disclose 
the “best mode” for carrying out the invention. However, the AIA provided that “the failure to disclose the 
best mode shall not be a basis on which any claim of a patent may be canceled or held invalid or otherwise 
unenforceable.” 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(3)(A)(2011). Another requirement in § 112 (pre-AIA) is that the claims 
particularly point out and distinctly claim “the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.” 
AIA § 112(b) has essentially the same language, but substituted “inventor or a joint inventor” for 
“applicant” and “the” for “his.” See § 112 (post-AIA). For the most recent Supreme Court decision on the 
meaning of the definite claim requirement, see Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 
(2014). 
185  Automotive Technologies Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1282 
(Fed. Cir. 2007). 
186 Cotropia, supra note 168, at 1871. 
187  Mueller, supra note 3, at 40. In addition, “Congress in 1958 (72 Stat. 848) declared that the 
U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was created under Article III. In 1961, a congressional statute 
designated the chief judge of the court as a member of the Judicial Conference of the United States. The 
U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was abolished in 1982 when its judges and its jurisdiction were 
transferred to the new U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.” History of the Federal Judiciary: 
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enablement requirement, and concluded that the “original claim, in itself constituted a 
description in the original disclosure equivalent in scope and identical in language to the 
total subject matter now being claimed.”188 Over time, however, the CCPA and then the 
Federal Circuit applied a written description requirement separate from the enablement 
requirement, but first only when the patent applicant had amended the claims after the 
initial application.189 In a series of subsequent decisions, discussed next, the Federal 
Circuit established the rule that the written description requirement applied to all patents, 
not simply those in which the applicant had substantively changed its claims during 
prosecution.190 
¶59 The en banc decision of the Federal Circuit in Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli 
Lilly and Co.191 involved genus claims of “methods for regulating cellular responses to 
external stimuli” to “reduce the harmful symptoms of certain diseases.”192 Relying on 
such decisions as Morse and Schriber,193 the en banc Federal Circuit held that “even after 
the introduction of claims,”194 the statute required a written description of what the 
applicant had invented, separate from the enablement requirement.195 
¶60 The Federal Circuit in Ariad repeated a number of times that in order for a patent 
claim to be valid, the specification had to disclose embodiments of the genus.196 A 
generic claim could define the boundaries of a broad genus, but “the question may still 
remain whether the specification, including original claim language, demonstrates that 
 
U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Federal Judicial Center, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/ 
page/courts_special_cpa.html[https://perma.cc/83Z6-7GZF]. 
188 In re Gardner, 475 F.2d 1389, 1391 (C.C.P.A. 1973), rehearing denied, 480 F.2d 879, 879–80 
(C.C.P.A. 1973) (“[W]e consider the original claim in itself adequate ‘written description’ of the claimed 
invention. It was equally a ‘written description’ whether located among the original claims or in the 
descriptive part of the specification.”). 
189 In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 991, 996 (C.C.P.A. 1967); In re Smith, 481 F.2d 910, 914 
(C.C.P.A. 1973);Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
190 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997); 
Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to Biotechnological 
Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 633 (1998); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 
1303, 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2004); LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1337 
(Fed. Cir. 2005).  
191 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).  
192 Id. at 1340. Claim 80 of the ‘516 patent, re-written to include the claim from which it 
depended, recited: “A method for modifying effects of external influences on a eukaryotic cell, which 
external influences induce NF-êB-mediated intracellular signaling, the method comprising altering NF-êB 
activity in the cells such that NF-êB-mediated effects of external influences are modified, wherein NF-êB 
activity in the cell is reduced] wherein reducing NF-êB activity comprises reducing binding of NF-êB to 
NF-êB recognition sites on genes which are transcriptionally regulated by NF-êB.” Id.  
193 Id. at 1345, 1346. 
194 Id. at 1345. 
195 Id. at 1345–46. 
196 Disclosing embodiments is not the same as constructing a prototype or reducing an invention to 
practice. As the Federal Circuit explained, “the written description requirement does not demand either 
examples or an actual reduction to practice; a constructive reduction to practice that in a definite way 
identifies the claimed invention can satisfy the written description requirement.” Id. at 1352. An “actual 
reduction to practice involves constructing a physical embodiment of the invention that works for its 
intended purpose.” Mueller, supra note 3, at 123, n.32. A “‘constructive reduction to practice’ occurs when 
an inventor files a patent application that discloses his invention in compliance with the first paragraph of 
35 U.S.C. § 112.” Id.  
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the applicant has invented species sufficient to support a claim to the genus.”197 Genus 
claims containing functional language create particular problems, because they “may 
simply claim a desired result, and may do so without describing species that achieve that 
result.”198 The court said that the written description requirement meant the applicant 
must show it “has invented species sufficient to support a claim to the functionally-
defined genus.”199  The court added that “merely drawing a fence around the outer limits 
of a purported genus is not an adequate substitute for describing a variety of materials 
constituting the genus and showing that one has invented a genus and not just a 
species.”200 
¶61 The Federal Circuit in Ariad explained that an adequate written description 
“requires the disclosure of either a representative number of species falling within the 
scope of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus so that one 
of skill in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the genus.”201 It added, 
“Nor do we set out any bright- line rules governing, for example, the number of species 
that must be disclosed to describe a genus claim, as this number necessarily changes with 
each invention, and it changes with progress in a field.”202 It held that the claims in Ariad 
were invalid because the specification did not satisfy the written description 
requirement.203 
¶62 More recently, in Novozymes A/S v. DuPont Nutrition Biosciences APS,204 the 
Federal Circuit addressed the validity of a patent issued on a continuation application 
filed in 2009 that claimed priority from Novozymes’ earlier 2000 provisional 
application.205 The 2000 provisional application “disclosed a potentially enormous 
number of alpha-amylase variants,” but “did not point out the specific variants later 
claimed” in the patent issued to Novozmes (the 2010 Patent).206 After Novozymes had 
learned of DuPont’s alpha-amylase variant,207 Novozymes added patent claims that the 
district court subsequently found DuPont infringed.208 
¶63 The Federal Circuit in Novozymes said one of the issues was “whether the 2000 
application demonstrates to one of ordinary skill in the art that, by the application's filing 
date, Novozymes had invented the particular alpha-amylase variants that Novozymes 
claimed almost a decade later in the” 2010 patent.209 Since the disclosure had not shown 
 
197 Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 598 F.3d at 1349 (emphasis added). 
198 Id. (emphasis added). 
199 Id. (emphasis added). 
200 Id. at 1350. 
201 Id.  
202 Id. at 1351. 
203 Id. at 1358. 
204 723 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
205 Id. at 1341. Section 111(b) covers provisional applications and provides that a claim is not 
required for a provisional application. If the invention claimed in the nonprovisional application “was 
adequately supported by the disclosure of the of the provisional application in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 
§112,¶1 . . . , the application can claim for the later nonprovisional application the benefit of the earlier 
provisional application’s filing date . . .” Mueller, supra note 3, at 54. 
206 Novozymes A/S, 723 F.3d at 1343. 
207 Id. at 1341. 
208 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Novozymes on infringement, and the 
jury awarded damages to Novozymes exceeding $18 million. Id. at 1338. 
209 Id. at 1348 (emphasis added). 
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that by the time of the priority date for the patent application (2000), Novozymes had 
invented the variant infringed by DuPont, the Federal Circuit held that Novozymes’ 
patent claim was invalid.210 In other words, although Ariad made clear that a genus claim 
does not have to expressly identify in the specification all the species in a claimed 
genus,211 under Novozymes the specification does have to adequately disclose the species 
which the patentee subsequently claims someone else is infringing. 
¶64 After Ariad genus patents can still issue, since a specification can adequately 
disclose a genus with “either a representative number of species falling within the scope 
of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus.”212 Professor 
Liivak explained that “the description of an actual embodiment that has been reduced to 
practice can be part of the support for a broader genus claim when the specification also 
discloses additional information, like some ‘correlation between function and structure,’ 
of the genus, or as put by the Supreme Court, some ‘quality common to’ the genus.”213 
Indeed, most claims are genus claims in one respect, since Professor Crouch has pointed 
out that “most claims cover an infinite variety of potential embodiments each involving a 
minor tweak in one way or another.”214 
¶65 The question remains what happens once the USPTO has awarded a genus patent 
for a composition, assuming the defendant does not challenge the validity of the genus 
patent under one of the AIA post grant procedures to challenge validity.215 This article 
discusses that question next. 
 
210 Id. at 1348 and 1351. See also AbbVie Deutschland GMBH & Co. v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 
F.3d 1285, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (requiring that the patents must at least describe some species 
representative of antibodies that are structurally similar to Stelara, the allegedly infringing product). 
211 See supra notes 202–03 and accompanying text. 
212 Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d at 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
In 2009, before the en banc decision in Ariad, Professor Adams wrote that the written description 
requirement would “eliminate the . . . circumstance where an inventor could make a valid claim to a genus 
containing species that the inventor did not invent.” Adams, supra note 94, at 65.  Professor Adams was 
correct in concluding that genus patents could only issue in the future if the inventor had invented the 
species claimed. Supra at notes 191-204 and accompanying text. See also Dennis Crouch, Federal Circuit: 
To Satisfy the Written Description Requirement, PATENTLY-O (Jan. 8, 2016), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/07/description-requirement-representative.html[https://perma.cc/P6H5-
282H] (“By design, patent claims generally cover a set of a variety of potential embodiments. . . . The 
courts have never required that all potential embodiments be disclosed. . . . [T]he operative question . . . [is] 
how many different species (embodiments) of an invention must be described in a patent document before 
the applicant can properly claim rights to the genus of all related species.”).  
213 Liivak, supra note 34, at 89. 
214 Id. As mentioned above, supra note 6, “genus” and “species” are simply relative terms when 
comparing one claim to another, understanding that one is a genus compared to the other, and the second is 
a species compared to the genus. 
215 See, e.g., §§ 311-319 (post-AIA) (inter partes review) and §§ 321-329 (post-AIA) (post-grant 
review). In inter partes review—§ 316(e) ()(post-AIA)—and post grant review—§ 326(e) ()(post-AIA)—
the challenger to a patent has the burden of proving invalidity by a preponderance of the evidence. The 
Supreme Court granted cert. on Jan. 15, 2016 in In re Cuozzo Speed Tech., LLC, a case involving inter
partes review procedures. See In re Cuozzo Speed Tech., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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C. The Presumption is that a Patentee Invented the Species Within the Scope of its 
Patented Genus Claim 
¶66 Once an individual obtains a patent (including of course a genus patent), there is a 
presumption that the patent is valid, and that presumption can only be rebutted by clear 
and convincing evidence.216 This presumption particularly makes sense with the written 
description requirement because of the oath or declaration an applicant must sign and 
submit to the USPTO that “he believes himself to be the original and first inventor of the 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or improvement thereof, for 
which he solicits patent.”217 
¶67 In Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc.,218 the Federal Circuit addressed a 
similar situation where a patentee assigned its patent to another party and signed an 
affidavit for the assignee that the patent was valid, but the assignor subsequently was 
sued for infringement by the assignee and defended it on the ground that the patent was 
invalid. The Federal Circuit said that the primary consideration was “the measure of 
unfairness and injustice that would be suffered by the assignee if the assignor were 
allowed to raise defenses of patent invalidity.”219 The Federal Circuit held in such a 
situation that the assignor “should be estopped from defending patent infringement 
claims by proving that what he assigned was worthless.”220  Similarly, when an applicant 
for a genus patent obtains a patent for a genus after submitting an oath or declaration to 
the USPTO that it invented the genus, the applicant should be estopped from 
subsequently taking a different position and saying it had not invented the species when 
(a) applying for a patent for a species within the genus, or (b) trying to enforce the 
subsequent species patent within the scope of the genus against a third party. 
¶68 Can the holder of a genus patent at least limit any estoppel by arguing that she 
cannot be required to have invented species within the genus resulting from advances in 
technology not known at the time of the genus invention?  It is true that patentees have at 
times been victorious in infringement litigation against defendants selling products using 
after-arising technology.221 However, the two reasons this has occurred would not be 
applicable to First Inventions by a pharmaceutical company with a broad genus patent 
 
216 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) provides in relevant part, “A patent shall be presumed valid. . . . The burden 
of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.” 
In Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011), the Supreme Court held that § 282 
“requires an invalidity defense to be proved by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 2242. In a concurring 
opinion joined by Justices Scalia and Alito, Justice Breyer said, “I believe it worth emphasizing that in this 
area of law as in others the evidentiary standard of proof applies to questions of fact and not to questions of 
law.” Id. at 2253. 
217 35 U.S.C. § 115 (pre-AIA). Section 115(b)(2) (post-AIA) similarly requires an oath or 
declaration that the applicant “believes himself or herself to be the original inventor or an original joint 
inventor of a claimed invention in the application.” An alternate oath or declaration can be submitted if the 
inventor is under an obligation to assign the invention to the applicant and has refused to sign the oath. 
§ 115(d) (post-AIA). 
218 Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
219 Id. at 1225. 
220 Id. at 1226. 
221 See Bernard Chao, The Infringement Continuum, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1359, 1359–68 (2014); 
and Lemley, supra note 9, at 1003–05. 
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and a subsequent patent application by that company for a species within the scope of the 
genus. 
¶69 First, compliance with the enablement doctrine is determined at the time the patent 
applicant files its application,222 so “[a]n inventor can properly claim broad subject matter 
so long as her research enables one skilled in the art to make and use her claimed 
invention as that invention was understood at the filing date.”223 On the other hand, in 
determining the existence of infringement, “Literal claim scope is not limited to the 
technologies that are already in existence at the time a claim is filed. It routinely 
encompasses technology . . . that can be realized only after a post-filing technological 
advance has occurred.”224 As a result of this “temporal paradox,”225 technologies 
unknown at the time of the patent application have not been taken into account in 
determining whether the specification enabled the claim, but have been taken into 
account in determining if the patent claim covered an accused product at the time of the 
alleged infringement.226 
¶70 Yet now that the written description requirement under Ariad is a separate 
requirement than enablement, for a patent claim to be valid the inventor must have 
invented/possessed the scope of the genus at the time of the application.227  Therefor the 
temporal paradox does not apply for written descriptions, and Professor Collins has 
concluded that “the principal impact of the written description requirement has been to 
restrict the reach of literal claim scope into after-arising technology.”228 He added that 
“all Federal Circuit cases that use the written description doctrine to invalidate claims 
have achieved a single goal: they have invalidated claims that were deemed to reach too 
far into after  arising technology, i.e., technology that is not invented until after the 
patent applicant files her application.”229 Similarly recognizing that Ariad limits the 
 
222 Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Whether the earlier 
applications enable the claims of the ‘561 patent is determined as of the filing date of each application.”). 
223 Merges, supra note 6, at 284. 
224 Kevin Emerson Collins, Enabling After-Arising Technology, 34 J. CORP. L. 1083, 1086 
(Summer 2009). 
225 Merges, supra note 6, at 284 (emphasis added). 
226 Merges and Duffy give the hypothetical of a patent for “fuzzballs,” assuming they were new, 
nonobvious and useful, and assuming further that at the time of application fuzzballs were only made of 
wool and cotton. The technology evolved and fuzzballs could be made from synthetic fibers.  They write, 
“Thus the definition of fuzzballs used in the question, ‘Did you enable the making of all fuzzballs?’ does 
not change over time, while the definition of the same term in the question, ‘Did someone infringe the 
claim to all fuzzballs?’ does change to reflect the inevitable growth of fuzzball technology.” Id. at 285; cf. 
Promega Corp. v. Life Tech. Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (whether a claim is enabled by 
the specification, in light of after-arising technologies, may depend on whether the term “comprising” is 
used in one of the individual limitations of a claim rather than the preamble to the claim).  
227 Supra notes 112–204 and accompanying text. See also AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & Co. KG 
v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“functionally defined claims can meet the 
written description requirement if a reasonable structure-function correlation is established, whether by the 
inventor as described in the specification or known in the art at the time of the filing date.”); Bos. Sci. 
Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 647 F.3d 1353, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[W]hen the four corners of the 
specification directly contradict information that the patentee alleges is “well-known” to a person of skill at 
the effective filing date, no reasonable jury could conclude that the patentee possessed the invention.”).  
228 Kevin Collins, An Initial Comment on Ariad: Written Description and the Baseline of Patent 
Protection for After-Arising Technology, 2010 PATENTLY-O PAT. L. J. 24, 60 (2010). 
229 Id. at 62–63. 
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ability of patentees to cover after-arising technology in their claims of literal 
infringement, Professor Cotropia concluded that “after-arising technologies can fall 
within a patent’s scope of exclusivity only be resorting to the doctrine of equivalents.”230 
¶71 Turning to after-arising technology and the doctrine of equivalents, “the proper 
time for evaluating equivalency—and thus knowledge of interchangeability between 
elements—is at the time of infringement, not at the time the patent was issued.”231 
Therefore, “[t]he doctrine of equivalents allows the patentee to claim those insubstantial 
alterations that were not captured in drafting the original patent claim but which could be 
created through trivial changes.”232 It follows that the doctrine of equivalents is not 
applicable when the claim was captured in drafting the original genus claim. 
¶72 Put another way: “Application of the doctrine of equivalents is the exception . . . , 
not the rule.”233  It applies when there is no literal infringement, as the Supreme Court 
indicated when it said, “The scope of a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead 
embraces all equivalents to the claims described.”234 Similarly, Professor Mueller has 
said, “The doctrine of equivalents permits a finding of patent infringement liability for 
accused devices that are not encompassed within the literal scope of a claim.”235 A 
species within the scope of a genus is not an equivalent to the genus, but part of the 
literally claimed genus, so there is no authority for applying the doctrine of equivalents 
when there is literal infringement. 
¶73 Professor Holbrook observed that “the Federal Circuit has precluded access to the 
doctrine of equivalents if the asserted equivalent is one that should have been in the 
inventor’s possession during the application process. ”236  Of course, the First Inventor 
has already submitted an oath that she was in possession of – had invented - the 
species.237 The Supreme Court vacated an earlier Federal Circuit decision in Festo and 
limited the use of the doctrine of equivalents when there had been a narrowing 
amendment during patent prosecution, but allowed the doctrine of equivalents to 
“capture” products encompassing after-arising technologies when the “equivalent may 
have been unforeseeable at the time of the application.”238 In the case of a species within 
the scope of a genus patent claim by the same party, the same party has already submitted 
an oath that she invented the genus, and the genus claim covers the species, so the 
 
230 Christopher A. Cotropia, ‘After-Arising’ Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope, 61 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 153 (2005).  
231 Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37 (1997). 
232 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 733 (2002). 
233 London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
234 Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 732. 
235 Mueller, supra note 3 at 107, note 86. 
236 Holbrook, supra note 56, at 15 (citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 
493 F.3d 1368, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2007)) (rejecting the patent claim, because, “Not only was the use of a non-
magnetic sleeve disclosed in the prior art, the ‘125 patent application itself clearly recognized the 
possibility of using a non-magnetic material for the sleeve.”).  
237 Supra note 217. 
238  Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 740. The Supreme Court added two other situations in which the 
doctrine of equivalents could apply, neither of which would be applicable to the case of a genus patent and 
subsequent species patent within the scope of the genus: “[T]he rationale underlying the amendment may 
bear no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question; or there may be some other reason 
suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the insubstantial substitute 
in question.” Id. at 740–41. 
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Supreme Court’s description of when the doctrine of equivalents could be available for 
unforeseeable events would be of no help to the First Inventor who has already literally 
claimed that species.239 
¶74 As a result, the possibility of after-arising technologies does not provide a valid 
basis for arguing that courts should allow a pharmaceutical company to circumvent 
Morse, Schriber and Ariad. 
D. Summary
¶75 The “invention is not simply a shorthand reference for the claimed subject matter,” 
but a “substantive technical concept” of the “inventor’s own solution to some technical 
problem for which the inventor seeks a patent.”240  Defining “the invention by the 
detailed technology discussion in the patent specification’s descriptions and drawings” 
appropriately “grounds exclusivity in what the inventor has actually done or plans to 
do.”241 A claim may be narrower than what is disclosed in the specification and still be 
valid,242 but if it is broader than what is disclosed, the claim is invalid, and the USPTO 
should reject the application. 243 
¶76 Under Ariad, an application for a genus patent “must demonstrate sufficient 
support in the specification to justify the scope of the claim by showing that the inventor 
was in possession of the entirety of the claimed invention.” (emphasis added)244  Once the 
patent is granted, there is a presumption the patent is valid, 245 which means the inventor 
invented the species claimed at the time of the patent application. All species within the 
scope of the genus constitute the patented invention.246 
¶77 The next part of this article argues that this presumption of patent validity should 
prevent the holder of the genus patent from defending a double patenting challenge to its 
subsequent patent for a species within the genus by arguing he had not really invented, or 
 
239 There is language in In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606–07 (C.C.P.A. 1977) that may suggest that 
a claim for a pioneer invention “can literally encompass later-developed technologies.” Cotropia, supra 
note 231, at 167. However, Hogan occurred decades before Ariad split the written description requirement 
from enablement that limited the reach of claims into subject matter encompassing after-arising technology. 
In addition, Professor Cotropia notes, “T“[he court in Hogan did not specifically hold that claim language 
can literally include after-arising technologies. In fact, the weight of Federal Circuit authority indicates the 
opposite.” Id.; see also Plant Genetic Systems, N.V. v. Dekalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1340–42 
(Fed. Cir. 2003). Moreover, in the case of a genus patent and a patent for a species within the scope of the 
genus by the same inventor, the genus patent has already been granted, and in many such cases it was 
admitted that the species was within the literal scope of the genus. See, e.g., Otsuka Pharm. Co. Ltd. v. 
Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2012); infra notes 431–51 and accompanying text; AbbVie Inc. v. 
Mathilda and Terence Kennedy Inst. of Rheumatology, 764 F. 3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014); infra notes 454–73 
and accompanying text. There would be no basis for applying the doctrine of equivalents. 
240 Liivak, supra note 162, at 5.  
241 Cotropia, supra note 168, at 1855–56. 
242 If a claim is narrower than what has been disclosed, then what is disclosed but not claimed is 
free to the public to use. See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Service Co., 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (en banc). 
243 Supra notes 162 and 171. 
244 Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779, 794 (2011) 
(emphasis added); see also supra notes 191–204 and accompanying text for discussion of Ariad. 
245 Supra note 217. 
246 Supra notes 181–82 and accompanying text. 
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possessed, the species at the time he obtained the genus patent. Put simply, a patentee 
should not be allowed to argue on the one hand he has invented the full scope of a genus 
but on the other hand subsequently defend a challenge to its species patent on the ground 
that he had not really invented the full scope of the genus at the time of the genus 
application. 
III. IT SHOULD BE PROHIBITED DOUBLE PATENTING FOR AN INVENTOR OR EMPLOYER TO 
APPLY FOR A PATENT FOR A SPECIES WITHIN SCOPE OF GENUS PATENT HELD BY SAME 
INVENTOR OR EMPLOYER 
A. Supreme Court/Supreme Court Justice: One Person May Not Cover the Same 
Invention with Two Patents 
 
¶78 In the 1800s federal courts announced and applied the common sense principle that 
“no patent can issue for an invention actually covered by a former patent, especially to 
the same patentee, although the terms of the claims may differ.” (emphasis added)247   If 
by “covered” the courts had meant that a patentee could not hold two patents that were 
the same, then any person could easily navigate around such doctrine by obtaining a 
second patent that was only different in minor ways (e.g., the first patent covered 100 
embodiments of a widget, whereas the second patent only covered 99 of the same 
embodiments) and essentially extend the first patent by years. 248 The Supreme Court and 
its justices did not so limit the principle. 
¶79 Before discussing at length the most significant Supreme Court decision on what 
has become known as double patenting, Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co.,249 the Court discusses 
three earlier decisions because the Court in Miller had done so in its holding. In none was 
there consideration of whether the two patents “covered” the “same invention” limited to 
comparing the patent claims. 
¶80 Even before the practice of patent claims had appeared,250 the Circuit Court for the 
District of Massachusetts had addressed double patenting in Odiorne v. Amesbury Nail 
Factory.251 Here, the plaintiff had obtained two patents on machinery for cutting, griping 
and heading nails: one in 1807 and the other in 1810 for the “invention and 
improvements.”252 Supreme Court Justice Story, sitting as a Circuit Justice, said, “[i]t 
 
247 Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 198 (1894) (emphasis added). 
248 Professors Merges and Duffy point out that under the Patent Act of 1952, if two different 
individuals applied for the same patent, that would be addressed by an interference and determination of 
priority under § 102(g). Merges, supra note 6, at 1145. 
249 See CHISUM, supra note 77, at vol. 3A, § 9.02[6], pp. 9-9 to 9-10 (“Miller . . . is the leading 
Supreme Court case on double patenting.”). See infra notes 271–303 and accompanying text discussing 
Miller. 
250 Supra notes 134–45 and accompanying text. 
251 Odiorne v. Amesbury Nail Factory, 18 F. Cas. 578, 2 Mason 28 (Cir. Ct. D. Mass. 1819). 
252 Id. at 578. Both were issued to Jesse Reed. Id. At the time, § 1 of the patent statute provided 
that a “citizen or citizens of the United States” could be eligible to receive a patent for an invention if “he 
or they have invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, not known or used 
before the application.” CHISUM, supra note 77, at vol. 9, app. 10-1. There was no separate section 
expressly discussing or defining what constituted prior art. Id. at app. 10-1 to 10-5. 
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cannot be, that a patentee can have in use at the same time two valid patents for the same 
invention; and if he can successively take out at different times new patents for the same 
invention, he may perpetuate his exclusive right during a century.”253 He added that a 
different result “would completely destroy the whole consideration derived by the public 
for the grant of the patent, viz. the right to use the invention at the expiration of the term 
specified in the original grant.”254 He concluded that the first patent “is an estoppel to any 
future patent for the same invention.”255 
¶81 By the time of James v. Campbell in 1881,256 patent applications included 
claims,257 but the Supreme Court looked beyond the claims to the specifications for the 
patents, which involved implements for postmarking letters.258 The original patent was 
issued in 1863,259 but that was surrendered and reissued in 1864, 1869 and 1870,260 with 
additional matter added in the process.261After discussing the drawings and other parts of 
the specifications,262 the Court stated the general principle that “the patentee could not 
include in a subsequent patent any invention embraced or described in a prior one granted 
to himself, any more than he could an invention embraced or described in a prior patent 
granted to a third person.”263 
¶82 In 1891, as the Supreme Court had in James, the Supreme Court in McCreary v. 
Pennsylvania Canal Co. 264 also looked beyond the claims to the rest of the specification 
to compare the inventions.265 McCreary involved two patents—one issued to John 
McCreary266 and the other to Elijah and John McCreary267—that involved improvements 
 
253 Id. at 579. Quoting from Odiorne and closely following its language, the Federal Circuit in 
Gilead Sci., Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., 753 F.3d 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2014) restated the principle as follows: 
“‘It cannot be’ that a patentee can obtain two patents in sequence ‘substantially for the same invention [ ] 
and improvements’; ‘it would completely destroy the whole consideration derived by the public for the 
grant of the patent, viz., the right to use the invention at the expiration of the term.’” Id. at 1212. 
254 Odiorne, 18 F. Cas. at 579.  
255 Id.  
256 James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356 (1881). 
257 Supra notes 138–45 and accompanying text. 
258 James, 104 U.S. at 357. 
259 Id. at 359. 
260 Id. at 357, 371. The Supreme Court first approved the practice of reissuing defective patents in 
1832, and that practice was codified in the Patent Act of 1836. Mueller, supra note 3, at 405. See 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 251–252 for current provisions for the reissuance of patents.  
261 James, 104 U.S. at 375–76 (“Another new matter . . . is the making of the blotter of cast iron, 
steel or other suitable material. The original specification . . . excludes such material. . . . the patentee has 
added two new diagrams to his drawings.”) 
262 Id. at 360, 375, 376, 379. 
263 Id. at 382. The Court concluded: the claims with the additional matter were void. Id. at 375. 
The broad claims were void as anticipated by inventions patented in England and the United States. Id. at 
378–79. The broad claims were void because the defendant did not use the specific device covered by the 
remaining claim of the second patent. Id. at 383. 
264 McCreary v. Pa. Canal Co., 141 U.S. 459 (1891). 
265 The Court was quoting from the third paragraph of the specification of U.S. Patent No. 129,844 
when it said, “I“[n patent numbered 129,844 the patentee stated that his improvement upon the prior patent 
consisted ‘in substituting for the projecting cut-water and notch, described in said patent for centering the 
boats together and forming a universal joint, a chain attached at both ends to one boat, and at its center to a 
central point on the adjacent end of the other boat,’ etc.” 141 U.S. at 462. 
266 See U.S. Patent No. 129,844.  
267 See U.S. Patent No. 125,684.  
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in steering devices for canal boats.268 The Court noted that the “combination of the earlier 
patent . . . is substantially contained in the later” and said that “if it be identical with it, or 
only a colorable variation from it, the second patent would be void, as a patentee cannot 
take out two patents for the same invention.”269 
¶83 In 1894, the Supreme Court gave its most detailed discussion of the prohibition 
against double patenting - one inventor obtaining two patents covering similar structures, 
but with modifications of a spring - in Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co.270 In Miller there were 
two patents derived from the same initial patent application271 for improvements in 
“wheeled cultivators,” and defendants claimed that “the invention shown in each of the 
patents in suit is identical.”272 However, the 1879 patent had 12 claims,273 and those 
claims differed from the 5 claims of the 1881 patent.274  Although the two sheets of 
drawings for both patents in the specifications seemed to be the same,275 the 1879 patent 
specification said the invention “consists in a spring which serves the double purpose of 
lifting or holding down the plows at will; and it is further stated that one spring may be 
adapted to serve all, or either one or more, of the offices above enumerated.”276  On the 
other hand, the specification of the 1881 patent described a narrower scope for the 1881 
patent, describing “the same invention or device covered by the patent of December 16, 
1879, [but] attempts to limit the invention and patent to the lifting operation of the 
springs, increasing as the beams are raised.”277 
 
268 Id. at 461–62. However, the plaintiffs did not assert John McCreary’s earlier patent in the 
infringement suit. Id. 
269 Id. at 467 (emphasis added). The master found that McCreary was limited to such profits as 
arose from the use of the improvement identified in the second patent. Id. at 463.  Since no damages were 
proved for the improvement covered by the second patent, the Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the 
master. Id. at 467–68. 
270 151 U.S. 186 (1894). See also CHISUM, supra note 77, at vol. 3A, § 9.02[6], pp. 9-9 to 9-10. 
271 Id. at vol. 3A, § 9.02[6], p. 9-10 (“Because of an interference with another application, Wright 
divided his application. The first patent (#222,767) issued on December 16, 1879, for the double action 
claim. After disposition of the interference, the second patent (#242,497) issued on June 7, 1881.”). 
272 Miller, 151 U.S. at 187. 
273 U.S. Patent No. 222,767, pp. 2–3. 
274 U.S. Patent No. 242,497, p. 3. 
275 Sheets 1 and 2 of U.S. Patent No. 222,767 and U.S. Patent No. 242,497. 
276 Miller, 151 U.S. at 200. 
277 Id. at 193. Chisum refers to the later ’497 patent as a “generic device. . . (i.e., a spring that 
provides no lifting force when in the operative position but lifting force when raised).” CHISUM, supra note 
77, at vol. 3A, § 9.02[6], p. 9-11. However, claims 1–3 of the earlier ’767 patent and the third paragraph of 
the specification for the ’767 patent made clear it applied where one or both functions were involved, as a 
result of adapting springs on the cultivator (genus patent): “In carrying out my invention the one spring 
may be adapted to serve all or either one or more of the offices above enumerated [downward force and 
lifting] and may be modified in its form, construction, and arrangement, as desired, provided its mode of 
action is retained.” On the other hand, all the claims of the later ’497 patent showed a single lifting function 
with adapted springs. See ’497 patent claims 1-5. See also ’497 patent p. 1, ll. 20-24 (“To this end the 
invention consists in applying lifting-springs in such manner that they exert upon the beams a maximum 
power or strain when the latter are above an operative position.”). The Court in Miller quoted the third 
paragraph of the specification from the ’767 patent (Id. at 188-189), so regardless of whether today a court 
would give the specifications less weight and treat the second claim as generic relative to the first under
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the Supreme Court in Miller did not treat the 
subsequent ’497 patent claims as generic. If it had, it could have easily rejected the second patent as invalid 
under its statement that a “second patent, although containing a broader claim, more generical [sic] in its 
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¶84 The Supreme Court in Miller then summarized its view of existing case law, such 
as Odiorne, James and McCreary.278 The Court said that “no patent can issue for [1] an 
invention actually covered by a former patent, [2] especially to the same patentee, [3] 
although the terms of the claims may differ.”279 The third quoted phrase, “terms of the 
claims may differ,” suggests that in determining whether the same invention is involved, 
courts must look at the embodiments of the inventions disclosed in the specifications and 
not simply what the draftsman claimed to be the invention.280 Although one might argue 
that this statement could refer to the use of different words in two claims that meant the 
same thing (e.g., twelve inches vs. a foot), the specifications showed the springs in the 
two cultivators were adapted to perform different functions.281 In other words, this was 
not a situation where the claims used different words to mean the same thing but a 
situation where the claims used different words and the specifications showed the springs 
differed. 
¶85 The second quoted phrase, “especially to the same patentee,” suggests that a patent 
for an improvement to a third party could be treated differently than a patent to the First 
Inventor for an improvement within the scope of the First Patent.282 While a different 
party could have a blocking patent for the Improvement, the First Inventor would not be 
allowed to obtain such a Follow-On Patent because he already had received his reward 
for the genus that included the species subsequently claimed.283 
¶86 The first quoted phrase, “covered by a former patent,” appears to refer to any 
invention within the scope of the claims of the first patent. That statement should 
preclude granting a patent for a species within the scope of the genus to the same 
inventor, because the genus would have covered and given the exclusive right to make 
and sell that species to the First Inventor.284 Indeed although Morse was not decided on 
double patenting, the dicta that Morse “could not take out a subsequent patent for a 
portion of his first invention, and thereby extend his monopoly beyond the period limited 
by law”285 is consistent with the principle stated in Miller 40 years later. 
¶87 The Court in Miller also said that a “second patent, although containing a broader 
claim, more generical in its character than the specific claims, contained in the prior 
 
character, than the specific claims, contained in the prior patent, is also void.” Miller, 151 U.S. at 198. It 
did not reject the second patent under the principle that a species of a genus anticipates a subsequent and 
broader genus. Thus, it seems the Court considered the ’497 patent narrower in scope than the earlier ’767 
patent. 
278 Id. at 198. 
279 Id. at 198 (emphasis added). 
280 The Supreme Court has expressed concern about not allowing attorneys to maneuver around 
patent principles with clever drafting. See supra note 33.
281 See ’497 patent para. 3 and ’767 patent para. 3. 
282 Indeed, the Court observed, “If the two patents in question had been granted to different 
parties, it admits of no question that the last would have been held an infringement of the first.” Miller, 151 
U.S. at 200. 
283 See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text for Professor Duffy’s suggestion that there are 
policy reasons for treating improvements by First Inventors differently than improvements by third parties. 
284 Supra note 3. 
285 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 114 (1864). 
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patent, is also void.”286 This is a reflection of the now recognized principle – at least 
when the earlier patent is prior art - that a species anticipates a genus.287 
¶88 In addition, the Court in Miller discussed the situation “where the second patent 
covers matter described in the prior patent, essentially distinct and separable from the 
invention covered thereby. . .”288 The Court explained, “A single invention may include 
both the machine and the manufacture it creates; and in such cases, if the inventions are 
really separable, the inventor may be entitled to a monopoly of each.”289 In other words, 
if an inventor creates a new and useful machine290 that produces a new and useful widget, 
she could patent both the machine and the widget the machine produced. The Court in 
Miller continued that in order for the second patent to be upheld in that situation, “it must 
distinctly appear that the invention covered by the later patent was a separate invention, 
distinctly different and independent from that covered by the first patent.”291 
¶89 Although the Court did not directly explain the meaning of “distinctly different and 
independent,” it added that the improvement “must consist in something more than a 
mere distinction of the breadth or scope of the claims of each patent.”292 A species within 
the scope of a genus is only different in breadth and scope from the genus claim.293 
Therefore, the statement that a mere distinction of the breadth or scope of the claims – as 
well as the earlier statement in Miller “covered by a former patent”294 – should eliminate 
granting a species patent within the scope of a genus patent to the inventor who had 
already patented the genus. 
¶90 The Supreme Court agreed that an inventor could make an improvement on his 
own invention and obtain a patent “where the invention is clearly distinct from, and 
independent of, one previously patented.”295  However, the Court concluded there was no 
distinct difference between the inventions in Miller, since the “matter sought to be 
covered by the second patent” was “inseparably involved in the matter embraced in the 
former patent.”296 This is consistent with rejecting a patent application by an inventor for 
a species after that inventor obtained a genus patent that covered the species, since the 
species patent would be “inseparably involved in the matter embraced in the former 
 
286 Miller, 151 U.S. at 198. 
287 Mueller, supra note 3, at 177 (“A heuristic to keep in mind for anticipation in the species/genus 
context is that species anticipates genus, but genus does not necessarily anticipate species.”). 
288 Miller, 151 U.S. at 198. 
289 Miller, 151 U.S. at 199. See also ERNEST BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB III, PATENT CLAIMS § 20:6, 
pt. 3, ch. 20 (3d ed. 2015) (discussing Miller and stating, “An apparatus and a product made by the 
apparatus are distinct inventions if it can be shown that the apparatus as claimed is not an obvious 
apparatus for making the product, and the apparatus as claimed can be used to make another materially 
different product, or that the product as claimed can be made by another materially different apparatus,” 
citing MPEP § 806.05(g)(9th ed.)). 
290 At the time of Miller, there was no non-obviousness requirement. Congress passed that 
requirement in 1952. Mueller, supra note 3, at 276. 
291 Miller, 151 U.S. at 198 (emphasis added). 
292 Id.  
293 A species within a genus has an additional limitation, but by the definition of a genus, the 
species, even with the additional limitation, is within the scope of the genus claim. Mueller, supra note 3. 
294 Supra notes 280 and 285 and accompanying text.  
295 Miller, 151 U.S. at 199. 
296 Id. at 200.  
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patent.”297 On the other hand, if a subsequent patent claim by the First Inventor was not 
within the scope of the First Invention, that patent claim should issue,298 because the 
patent he had already received had not covered the subsequent invention. 
¶91 The Supreme Court in Miller explained “It certainly did not involve patentable 
novelty to drop or omit from the patent a claim for the depressing action of the spring 
arrangement which might be effected by any mere mechanical contrivance.”299 The Court 
continued that “a patentee cannot so split up his invention for the purpose of securing 
additional results, or of extending or of prolonging the life of any or all of its elemental 
parts.”300 The Court held that the second patent was void.301 
¶92 The Supreme Court in Miller did not discuss or even identify the statutory basis for 
the prohibition on double patenting. This is not surprising, since Professor Menell has 
observed that “the most influential patent jurists [of the nineteenth century] . . . operated 
in a less formal, common- law-oriented mode.  . . . they did not typically tie their 
interpretation strictly to statutory text . . . . they evolved patent law into a workable, 
dynamic system.”302 As discussed next, however, the Federal Circuit has identified a 
statutory basis for double patenting and constructed a complicated set of rules Supreme 
Court in Miller. 
B. Double Patenting in the Federal Circuit 
1. Introduction 
 
¶93 As set forth above in IIC, a person inventing a new and useful composition of 
matter has a right to a patent for that composition, assuming the other criteria for 
patentability are satisfied.  A person does not have the right to a patent, however, if that 
patent claim exceeds the scope of the embodiments disclosed in the specification. The 
embodiments are key. Moreover, “patented invention” in § 271(a) refers to any 
composition satisfying the elements of a genus patent claim, even though many of those 
compositions would fit within the definition of a narrower genus (e.g., a widget of 
A+B+C+D and a widget of A+B+C would be a patented invention of and would infringe 
a patent for a widget comprising A+B). 
¶94 Yet in a confusing and inconsistent string of cases discussed in this IVB, the 
Federal Circuit has focused on the boundaries of the claims rather than the embodiments 
the claims cover. This allows skillful drafters to extend the exclusive rights under patent 
law by first claiming the world and subsequently claiming a smaller part of the world. 
The Federal Circuit’s decisions are inconsistent with the principle announced in Miller 
and Morse and with some earlier decisions of the CCPA and the Fourth and Seventh 
Circuits before the creation of the Federal Circuit, discussed below. 
 
297 Id. at 200. 
298 Assuming the other criteria for a patent were satisfied. 
299 Id. Chisum says that this reason for the holding in Miller “is sounder on the facts.” CHISUM, 
supra note 77 at vol. 3A, § 9.02[6], p. 9-11.  
300 Miller, 151 U.S. at 201.  
301 Id. at 200. 
302 Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wandering in the Wilderness, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1308–09 
(2011).  
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¶95 The Federal Circuit has labeled as “double patenting”303 its version of the Miller 
principle that “no patent can issue for an invention actually covered by a former patent, 
especially to the same inventor.”304  The Federal Circuit explained, “If an inventor could 
obtain several sequential patents on the same invention, he could retain for himself the 
exclusive right to exclude . . . far beyond the term awarded to him under the patent laws,” 
and concluded that the “doctrine of double patenting was primarily designed to prevent 
such harm by limiting a patentee to one patent term per invention or improvement.”305 
¶96 The Federal Circuit has identified two “types” of double patenting: “same invention 
type double patenting” and “obviousness type double patenting,”306 also sometimes 
known, respectively, as statutory double patenting and nonstatutory double patenting.307 
The appellate courts and scholars have concluded that the basis for the same invention 
type double patenting prohibition is §101, since it provides that “whoever invents” a 
product meeting the requirements for a patent may obtain “a patent” (interpreted to mean 
one patent) for her invention.308  However, another statutory basis is the word “new” in 
§101: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter . . . .”309 If a patent application asks for a patent on a 
composition of matter set forth in an earlier patent, the composition of matter in the 
second patent application would not be “new” under the commonly understood meaning 
of “new,” so should not qualify for a patent under § 101. 310 
¶97 Somewhat more obliquely, courts have referred to obviousness-type double 
patenting as a “judicially created doctrine.”311 Recently, however, the Federal Circuit said 
that “obviousness type double patenting is grounded in the text of the Patent Act,” 
referring to § 101.312 Also, as discussed below,313 as a result of the passage of the AIA, 
 
303 Gilead Sci., Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., 753 F.3d 1208, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Miller). 
304 Miller, 151 U.S. at 198. 
305 Gilead Sci., Inc., 753 F.3d at 1212. 
306 In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 892–93 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
307 Mueller, supra note 3, at 72. 
308 In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 441 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (“35 U.S.C. § 101 prevents two patents from 
issuing on the same invention”); Merges, supra note 6, at 1145; Mueller, supra note 3, at 72. 
309 35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). 
310 Merriam-Webster defines “new” as “having recently come into existence.” New, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/new (last visited Oct. 9, 2015). There has been 
growing recognition by the courts that “new” in § 101 means what it says and is not a historical relic or 
identical to novelty in § 102. In Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 
(2012), the Supreme Court rejected the argument that newness could be disregarded when evaluating 
patentable subject matter under § 101 and acknowledged that “the § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry and, say, 
the § 102 novelty inquiry might sometimes overlap.” Id. at 1304. In Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013), involving Myriad’s patent claim for isolated DNA and 
cDNA segments, the Supreme Court said the issue was whether “Myriad's patents claim any ‘new and 
useful . . . composition of matter’” under § 101 or instead claimed naturally occurring phenomena. Id. at 
2116.  In Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015), the Federal Circuit 
recognized that “pragmatic analysis of § 101 is facilitated by considerations analogous to those of §§ 102 
and 103 as applied to the particular case.” Id. at 1347.  See also Rebecca Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages or 
Dead-Hand Control? Patentable Subject Matter for Diagnostic Methods After In re Bilski, 3 CASE W. 
RESERVE J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 54–55 (2012). 
311 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs, Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 967 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  
312 AbbVie Inc. v. Mathilda and Terence Kennedy Inst. of Rheumatology Trust, 764 F.3d 1366, 
1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
313 Infra, notes 345–52 and accompanying text. 
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there is now a more clear statutory basis for obviousness type double patenting, since 
§ 3(b)(2) of the AIA incorporates by reference the intent of Congress in the CREATE Act 
that the double patenting prohibition should apply when there is no prior art. 
2. Significance of “prior art” for double patenting 
 
¶98 When analyzing double patenting, it is necessary to discuss briefly the technical 
nature of “prior art,” since the Federal Circuit has said that “‘double patenting’ is 
normally applied as a ground of rejection when the patent used to support the double 
patenting rejection is not available as a reference to show ‘prior art’ under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102 or 103.”314 Of course, a person cannot obtain a patent for an invention unless it is 
novel within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 102 (pre-AIA),315 and for an invention to lack 
novelty—to be anticipated—there must be “a single prior art disclosure of all elements of 
the claimed invention,”316 either expressly or inherently.317 Novelty, however, “does not 
mean that the invention has not previously existed in an absolute sense. Rather, it means 
that the invention, as claimed, does not fall within—is not anticipated by—one of the 
seven categories of prior art defined by Congress in 35 U.S.C. Section 102.”318 Section 
102(a) pre-AIA) provides that in order for a prior art reference—such as a printed 
publication—to be “prior” art, it must have existed “before the invention.”319 
 
314 In re Land, 368 F.2d 866, 868 (C.C.P.A. 1966). Professor Crouch has said that an obviousness-
type double patenting is only relevant when a prior patent cannot be considered prior art as defined by 
Sections 102 and 103(a) of the Patent Act. Dennis Crouch, Obviousness-Type Double Patenting and 
Splitting Ownership (CAFC Says Don’t Do It), PATENTLY-O (May 8, 2009), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2009/05/obviousness-type-double-patenting-and-splitting-ownership-cafc-says-
dont-do-it.html[https://perma.cc/RS5D-YWQX]. In certain cases, however, in which the Federal Circuit 
looked at the specification of the earlier patent to determine whether there was double patenting, the courts 
effectively treated the earlier patent specification as prior art. See Geneva Pharm., Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline 
PLC, 349 F.3d 1373, 1385–86 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“a claim to a method of using a composition is not 
patentably distinct form an earlier claim to the identical composition in a patent disclosing the identical 
use.”); Sun Pharm. Ind., Ltd. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 611 F.3d 1381, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming a finding 
of double patenting when “an earlier patent claims a compound, disclosing the utility of that compound in 
the specification, and a later patent claims a method of using that compound for a particular use described 
in the specification of the earlier patent.”); Takeda Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Doll, 561 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (“On remand, the district court should determine whether these processes were disclosed before 
January 8, 1990, the date of filing of the ’216 process patent.”). In Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., 
678 F.3d 1280, 1286, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012), the earlier genus patent was prior art for the subsequent 
species patent, which the Federal Circuit analyzed for double patenting. The Federal Circuit said “[T]he 
patent principally underlying the double patenting rejection need not be prior art.” Id. at 1297. This article 
does not address these apparent inconsistencies. 
315 Lisa A. Dolak & Michael L. Goldman, Responding to Prior Art Rejections – An Analytical 
Framework, 83 PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 5 (2001); Kirk M. Hartung, ‘Prior Art’: The Undefined 
Key to Section 103 of the 1952 Patent Act, 32 DRAKE L. REV. 703, 704–05 (1952). 
316 Structural Rubber Prod. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 715 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
317 Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
318 Dolak, supra note 316, at 5 (discussing pre-AIA § 102). 
319 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (pre-AIA) (“A person shall not be entitled to a patent unless (a) the 
invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in 
this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent . . . .”). As discussed 
below in Part V, the AIA changes both what constitutes an art reference and when an art reference is prior 
art. 
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¶99 Even though patents are expressly mentioned in § 102(a) pre-AIA) as a category of 
prior art, there are a number of situations in which an earlier patent might not constitute 
“prior art” to a pending patent application, particularly when the applicant for the second 
patent is the same person as the holder of the earlier patent.320 After all, it would be 
impossible for an inventor to disclose her invention (in a printed publication or 
anywhere) “before the invention” as required in § 102(a) (pre-AIA).321 Professors Merges 
and Duffy wrote that “only a third party can create novelty problems under § 102(a), 
whereas anyone—including the inventor . . . —can create prior art that serves as a 
statutory bar under 1952 Act §102(b),”322 which only requires public disclosure or use 
more than a year before the patent application. The predecessor court to the Federal 
Circuit, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), said, “Absent a statutory bar 
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), (c), or (d), applicant’s own invention cannot be ‘prior art’ to 
him.”323 
¶100 In short, pre AIA there are art references in existence that may not constitute prior 
art. The double patenting doctrine fills a potential gap in preventing persons from 
circumventing the technicalities of prior art and obtaining two patents on the same 
invention.324 
 
3.  What person must hold the patents 
 
¶101 In Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc.,325 the Federal Circuit said, “The 
double patenting doctrine ‘precludes one person from obtaining more than one valid 
patent for either (a) the ‘same invention,’ or (b) an ‘obvious’ modification of the same
invention.”326  The language in Otsuka - “one person from obtaining” - and the language 
in both pre-AIA and AIA §101 - “Whoever invents . . . is entitled to a patent” - indicate 
that the inventor of both patents should be the same. Indeed, under §102(pre-AIA), 
Professor Merges explains, “If the second application were filed by a different inventor, . 
 
320 The AIA changed the timing for judging whether an art reference was “prior” from “before the 
invention” in § 102(a) ()(pre-AIA) to “before the effective filing date of the claimed invention” in 
§ 102(a)(1) and (2) ()(post-AIA). As a result, certain disclosures by the inventor which might not be prior 
art pre-AIA can be prior art post-AIA. This article discusses the significance of that change in Part V. 
321 Other categories of prior art in § 102(pre-AIA) similarly refer to “before the invention by the 
applicant for patent” and “before such invention.” See § 102(e)(pre-AIA) and § 102(g) ()(pre-AIA). 
322 Merges, supra note 6, at 341, n.2. 
323 In re Fout, 675 F.2d 297, 300, n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1982). The court added, “However, applications 
having the same inventor and claiming the same invention are subject to rejection for double patenting. In 
contrast, if the inventors are different, no such rejection can be made; rather, an interference is in order.” Id. 
Under § 102(b), an inventor loses her right to a patent if her invention was in “public use” or “on sale” in 
this country for more than one year prior to the patent application. Under § 102(c), an inventor loses her 
right to an invention if she has abandoned her invention. Under AIA § 102(d), an inventor loses her right to 
a patent if “the invention was patented or caused to be patented, or was the subject of an inventor’s 
certificate, by the applicant . . . in a foreign country . . . filed more than twelve months before the filing of 
the application in the United States.” 
324 Crouch, Splitting Ownership, supra note 315. 
325 Otsuka Pharm. Co. Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
326 Id. at 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 892 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
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. . The PTO would declare an interference and then apply the priority rules in §102(g) to 
determine which inventor was entitled to the patent.”327 
¶102 The principle of one individual inventor328 obtaining only one patent for the same 
invention does not address in what circumstances double patenting may arise when there 
are joint inventors. The prevailing view is that double patenting can exist when there is 
one common individual inventor among the inventors listed in the two patents.329 First of 
all, in Miller, although it was not necessarily talking about joint inventors, the Supreme 
Court said that “no patent can issue for an invention actually covered by a former patent, 
especially to the same patentee,”330 which suggests that double patenting might be 
present when the patentees are not the same.331 In In re Hubbell,332 the Federal Circuit 
expressly found double patenting applicable when there were multiple inventors for both 
patents and only one common inventor for the two patents.333  As reflected in the next 
section, however, there are some decisions seemingly in tension with Hubbell.334 
¶103 The more significant practical question for pharmaceutical companies may be what 
happens when the individual employees are the inventors, and the company is the 
assignee for either both patents or the patent and patent application.335 Professor Merges 
and Duffy say that under the CREATE Act,336 discussed below, obviousness type double 
patenting “can arise where the two patents have different inventors but the same 
 
327  Merges, supra note 6, at 1145. 
328  The inventor is the individual “who has exerted the creative mental effort in the act of 
invention.” 3 MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 10:13 (4th ed. 2013).. 
329 35 U.S.C. § 116(a) provides, “When an invention is made by two or more persons jointly, they 
shall apply for patent jointly and each make the required oath, except as otherwise provided in this title. 
Inventors may apply for a patent jointly even though (1) they did not physically work together or at the 
same time, (2) each did not make the same type or amount of contribution, or (3) each did not make a 
contribution to the subject matter of every claim of the patent.” 
330 Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 198 (1894) (emphasis added). 
331 Id.; supra notes 283–84 and accompanying text. 
332 In re Hubbell, 709 F.3d 1140 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
333 Id. at 1147 (“Based on the foregoing, although Hubbell argues that we should create a specific 
exception barring application of obviousness-type double patenting in instances where the conflicting 
claims share only common inventors, rather than common ownership, we see no valid basis for doing so.”). 
MPEP § 804¶I.A now provides, “Double patenting may exist between an issued patent and an application 
filed by the same inventive entity, a different inventive entity having a common inventor, a common 
applicant, . . . ,” citing Hubbell. 
334 See, e.g., In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 1016 (C.C.P.A. 1964); In re Kaplan, 789 F.2d 1574 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986) ; infra  notes 365–72 and 423–28 and accompanying text. 
335 Professor Merges has explained that this is a typical situation, with the employees having initial 
rights to the patents, but with contractual obligations to assign such patents to the employer. See Robert P. 
Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5-10 (1999). 
336 See H.R. REP. NO. 108-425, at 5–6 (2004) (“Congress intends that subject matter developed by 
another person, which qualifies as prior art only under one or more of subsections (e), (f), and (g) of section 
102 of title 35, and a claimed invention shall be deemed to be owned by the same person, or subject to an 
obligation of assignment to the same person where specific conditions are satisfied. The Act achieves this 
by eliminating the use of certain information and prior art in obviousness determinations in the 
circumstances addressed in the legislation. . . . The doctrine of ‘obviousness-type double patenting,’ a 
judicial doctrine used by courts to prevent patentees from obtaining an unjustifiable extension of the 
amount of time to exercise a patent’s right to exclude, shall apply to such patents. . . . Congress intends that 
parties who seek to benefit from this Act to waive the right to enforce any patent separately from any 
earlier patent that would otherwise have formed the basis for an obviousness-type double patenting 
rejection.”).  
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assignee.”337 They explained that “while § 103(c) [pre-AIA] allows a firm to obtain 
patents on obvious variations created by different researchers, the courts have still 
invoked the double patenting rule to ensure that the two patent terms expire 
simultaneously.”338 They added that as a result, the “double patenting doctrine is growing 
more important to large research corporations.”339 
¶104 There have been four iterations of what initially was 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (pre-AIA). 
The first of these four iterations was a response to a 1973 decision of the CCPA that an 
earlier invention by an employee that only satisfied § 102(g) (pre-AIA)340 in interference 
proceedings could also be cited as prior art to invalidate as obvious the patent claim of a 
subsequent invention made by a different employee of the same company.341 As a result, 
in 1984 Congress amended § 103(c) (pre-AIA) and “effectively gave corporations the 
right to patents on obvious variants of in-house efforts qualifying as prior invention under 
35 U.S.C. 102(f) or (g)” (pre-AIA).342 In the second iteration, as part of the American 
Inventors Protection Act of 1999, § 103(c) (pre-AIA) “was further modified to include 
commonly owned prior art under 102(e) (pre-AIA) . . . (i.e., disclosures in earlier-filed 
patents or published patent applications of ‘another’) in the list of categories of prior art 
that ‘shall not preclude patentability’ under § 103” (pre-AIA).343 
¶105 In the third iteration of § 103(c) (pre-AIA), Congress passed the CREATE Act, 
which excluded from the obviousness determination information generated by parties to a 
joint research agreement involving the inventor only if it qualified as prior art under 
§§ 102(e) (pre-AIA) (information disclosed in earlier-filed published patent applications 
of “another” person as of the date of the application), 102(f) (information derived from 
another) and 102(g) (pre-AIA) (private inventive activity of another).344The House 
 
337 Merges, supra note 6, at 1145. The question of how to treat two patents with different inventors 
but the same assignee is not a new issue. See John F. Witherspoon, So-Called Common Assignee Double 
Patenting – an Issue in Search for a Home, 4 APLA Q. J. 329, 349 (1976) (“Co-assigned different inventor 
entity cases, particularly where joint activity of co-workers is involved, present a unique problem requiring 
special attention. . . . Legislative response to this increasingly complex problem is an idea whose time has 
come.”). Thanks to Charles L. Gholz for pointing out this article. 
338 Merges &Duffy, supra note 6, at 1146. 
339 Id.  
340 In In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1289 (C.C.P.A. 1973), the CCPA interpreted § 102(g) to mean 
“the use of the prior invention of another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it under the 
circumstances of this case which include the disclosure of such invention in an issued patent, is available as 
‘prior art’ within the meaning of that term in § 103 by virtue of § 102(g).” Section 102(g) applied to a 
patent application when there had been prior non-public use in the United States by another party of the 
same invention as the claimed in the patent application. Nard, supra note 43, at 290–91. The AIA 
eliminated § 102(g) and substituted a provision for prior user rights in post-AIA § 273. Id. at 297–99. 
341 See also Mueller, supra note 3, at 287.  
342 Id. at 290. Section 102(f) represented the “central principle” that a person cannot simply 
copy someone else’s invention and obtain a patent for it. The AIA eliminated § 102(f), but not that central 
principle. Id. at 219. The 1984 amendment added the following language to § 103: “Subject matter 
developed by another person, which qualifies as prior art only under subsections (f) or (g) of section 102 of 
this title, shall not preclude patentability under this section where the subject matter and the claimed 
invention were, at the time the invention was made, owned by the same person or subject to an obligation 
of assignment to the same person.” Id. at 289. 
343 Id. at 290. The AIPA provided in § 4807(a), “Section 103(c) of title 35, United States Code, is 
amended by striking ‘subsection (f) or (g)’ and inserting ‘one or more of subsections (e), (f) and (g).” See 
Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999) 
344 See H.R. REP. NO. 108-425, supra note 337, at 5. As a result of the CREATE Act, § 103(c)(1) 
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Report accompanying the CREATE Act explained Congress intended that the courts 
apply the double patenting prohibition in place of consideration of such disclosures in 
determining obviousness.345 That Report also said, “Congress intends that parties who 
seek to benefit from this Act to waive the right to enforce any patent separately from any 
earlier patent that would otherwise have formed the basis for an obviousness-type double 
patenting rejection.”346 
¶106 In the fourth iteration of § 103(c), as part of the AIA, Congress moved what had 
been § 103(c) (pre-AIA) to § 102(b)(2)(C) (post-AIA), so what had been only a limitation 
on what a court could consider for purposes of determining obviousness also became a 
limitation on what references a court could consider in determining both novelty and 
obviousness.347 Section 102(b)(2) (post-AIA) provides that a disclosure shall not be 
considered prior art if “(C) the subject matter disclosed and the claimed invention, not 
later than the effective filing date of the claimed invention, were owned by the same 
person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person.”348 In addition, 
§ 102(c) (post-AIA) provides that § 102(b)(2) (post-AIA) is satisfied if: “(1) the subject 
matter disclosed was developed and the claimed invention was made by, or on behalf of, 
1 or more parties to a joint research agreement that was in effect on or before the 
effective filing date of the claimed invention; (2) the claimed invention was made as a 
result of activities undertaken within the scope of the joint research agreement; and (3) 
the application to patent the claimed invention discloses or is amended to disclose the 
names of the parties to the joint research agreement.”349 As a result, parties can “enter 
into joint-research agreements in order to exclude previous patent disclosures as prior art, 
even after they have developed the second invention, as long as no patent application has 
yet been filed for the second invention.”350 
¶107 Significantly, the AIA also effectively gave the force of law to the CREATE Act 
legislative history on double patenting through an uncodified part of the AIA.351 
Specifically, AIA § 3(b)(2) provides, “The enactment of section 102(c) of title 35, United 
States Code, under paragraph (1) of this subsection is done with the same intent to 
promote joint research activities that was expressed, including in the legislative history, 
 
provided, “Subject matter developed by another person, which qualifies as prior art only under one or more 
of subsections (e), (f), and (g) of section 102 of this title, shall not preclude patentability under this section 
where the subject matter and the claimed invention were, at the time the claimed invention was made, 
owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person.” Pub. L. No. 108-
453, 118 Stat. 3596 (2004). 
345 H.R. REP. NO. 108-425, supra note 337, at 6. That Report cited four decisions of the CCPA and 
Federal Circuit as examples of double patenting, without any suggestion that these examples were the 
extent of the double patenting prohibition, and preceded the decisions with the phrase, “See, e.g.” Id. One 
of the decisions in that Report cited Miller as authority for the double patenting prohibition. See In re 
Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing Miller). 
346 H.R. REP. NO. 108-425, supra note 337, at 6. 
347 Mueller, supra note 3, at 268–69; Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America 
Invents Act: Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. B. J. 465, 487 (2012). 
348 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)(C) (post-AIA); Mueller, supra note 3, at 269.   
349 § 102(c) (post-AIA); Mueller, supra note 3, at 269; Matal, supra note 348, at 487. 
350 Matal, supra note 348, at 487.  
351 Id. at 486; Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, § 3(b)(2) (2011). In light of the “transfer” of 
§ 103(c) (pre-AIA) to § 102 (post-AIA) and its application to both obviousness and novelty, see supra, note 
348, it is not clear why the same conclusion would not also apply to same invention double patenting. 
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through the enactment of the . . . ‘CREATE Act.’” AIA § 3(b)(2) further directs that the 
“United States Patent and Trademark Office shall administer section 102(c) of title 35, 
United States Code, in a manner consistent with the legislative history of the CREATE 
Act that was relevant to its administration by the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office.”352 
¶108 Professor Crouch, before the adoption of the AIA, concluded that “an obviousness 
type double patenting rejection requires a link between the two applications—either in 
terms of inventorship or ownership.”353 Similarly, MPEP § 804.II.B provides that 
obviousness type double patenting can arise when the two patents or patent applications 
are commonly owned or subject to a joint research agreement. Of course, the 
determinations made on whether the same person is holding two patents can raise 
difficult questions (such as whether affiliated corporations are the same entity), and no 
legal standard is without grey areas.354 
¶109 Where the Federal Circuit has significantly—and inconsistently—restricted the 
double patenting prohibition stated by the Supreme Court in Miller, it equates the 
invention with the boundary of the claims rather than considering all embodiments 
disclosed by the specification and claims. 
 
4.  Federal Circuit has eviscerated and ruled inconsistently on double patenting 
 
¶110 The Federal Circuit has eviscerated the double patenting doctrine and ruled 
inconsistently with predecessor courts by determining the invention from the “boundary” 
of the claims rather than the embodiments disclosed by the specification and claims. In 
contrast, the Supreme Court cases in the 1800s compared the inventions described in the 
specifications, even after the practice of peripheral claiming had commenced.355 
¶111 Due to the importance of the Patent Act of 1952, this article next reviews a number 
of appellate decisions since the Patent Act of 1952 and explains that there is no basis for 
concluding that the Patent Act of 1952 changed the meaning of the term “invention.” 
This review discloses that the Federal Circuit has disregarded not only Miller but some 
earlier appellate cases and improperly changed double patenting from (a) a principle 
under § 101to prevent patent holders from extending exclusive rights over some of the 
same embodiments in successive patents into (b) only an alternate obviousness analysis 
 
352 America Invents Act 35 U.S.C. § 3(b)(2) 
353 Crouch, Splitting Ownership, supra note 315. Section 102(c) (post AIA) provides: Subject 
matter disclosed and a claimed invention shall be deemed to have been owned by the same person or 
subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person in applying the provisions of subsection (b)(2)(C) 
if:(1) the subject matter disclosed was developed and the claimed invention was made by, or on behalf of, 1 
or more parties to a joint research agreement that was in effect on or before the effective filing date of the 
claimed invention; (2) the claimed invention was made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope 
of the joint research agreement; and (3) the application for patent for the claimed invention discloses or is 
amended to disclose the names of the parties to the joint research agreement.” 
354 See, for instance, the discussion of Sarett and Kaplan, infra at notes 365366–73 and 424–29 
and accompanying text. 
355 Supra, Part IVA, notes 248–302 and accompanying text. 
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under § 103 (pre-AIA) comparing the boundaries of the claims rather than the 
embodiments disclosed in the specifications.356 
¶112 A few years after the adoption of the Patent Act of 1952, in Weatherhead Co. v. 
Drillmaster Supply Co.,357 the Seventh Circuit358 held that if a person received a genus 
patent and subsequently received a species patent within the scope of the patented genus, 
the second patent constituted prohibited double patenting.359 Weatherhead was an 
infringement suit involving two patents to the same inventor for metal packing 
rings/joints.360 The earlier issued,361 more general ‘413 patent applied to “material 
sufficiently hard to shear said tube and [] sufficiently ductile to be radially contracted.”362 
The more specific claims in the subsequent ‘217 patent were for rings “made of low 
carbon steel which has been surface hardened by means of a potassium cyanide bath.”363 
The Seventh Circuit found, “No one could manufacture the device claimed in ‘217 
without infringing ‘413,” so held that “the appellants are guilty of double patenting and 
their second patent (No. 2,171,217) is invalid.”364 In other words, the Seventh Circuit 
held—consistent with the position taken in this article—that the ‘217 patent for a species 
within the scope of the earlier genus patent granted to the same inventor constituted 
improper double patenting. 
¶113 In 1964, in contrast, the CCPA held there was no double patenting in In re 
Sarett,365an often cited case involving a genus and subsequent species patent, which did 
not involve the same inventors. Related, but not identical parties filed on the same day 
 
356 This article does not contest using § 101 as an alternate obviousness analysis under § 103 
(either pre-AIA or post-AIA) when there is no prior art, but contends the double patenting prohibition is 
more than just a check on obviousness in those situations. The double patenting prohibition highlighted in 
different ways in Morse, Miller, and Singer, supra notes 1–2, 146–53, 271–302 and 25–27, is also a check 
on attempts by the inventor or his employer after the genus patent to gain longer exclusive rights over parts 
of the genus.  
357 227 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1955).  
358 Prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982, the applicable federal regional circuit court 
of appeals heard appeals in patent infringement cases. In 1982, all appeals from patent cases were 
consolidated in the newly created Federal Circuit. Mueller, supra note 3, at 40, 47–48. 
359 227 F.2d at 102. 
360 Id. at 99–100. Apparently the earlier issued patent was not considered prior art because the two 
patents were by the same inventor, Kreidel, and the applications leading to the patents had been copending 
for some period of time. Id. There are seemingly inconsistent decisions on the effect of copending 
applications by the same inventor. Compare General Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH, 972 
F.2d 1272, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“Neither is statutory ‘prior art’ to the other because the patent 
applications were copending and, further, because there can be no “prior invention by another ” (cf. 35 
U.S.C. § 102(g)) because both are the inventions of Zosel.”); In re Coleman, 189 F.2d 976, 978 (C.C.P.A. 
1951) (“Since these patents were copending with the appealed application they do not constitute technical 
prior art references but are to be looked to only for what they claim”); In re Fong, 378 F.2d 977, 980 
(C.C.P.A. 1967) (“We must reject the premise that common ownership and copendency in themselves 
necessarily preclude consideration of a patent as a part of the prior art.”) 
361 The ‘413 patent was issued on December 6, 1938, and the ‘217 patent was issued on August 
29, 1939. Id. at 99. 
362 Id. at 101, citing claim 11 of the ‘413 patent. See also U.S. Patent No. 2,139,413 pp.3, ll, 29–31 
(filed Oct 25, 1933). 
363 227 F.2d at 100.  See also U.S. Patent No. 2,171,217, pp. 3, ll, 17–18, 26–27 (filed Aug 17, 
1937). 
364 227 F.2d at 102 (emphasis added). 
365 In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 1016 (C.C.P.A. 1964). 
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what became the Arth patent and what was the Sarett application.366 Also, although there 
was a genus patent and a subsequent species patent application, the species patent claim 
was not clearly within the scope of the earlier genus.367 One claim of the Arth patent 
contained “a broad, functional, generic expression,” for oxidizing alcohols,368 but that 
claim also included additional process limitations369 not included in the Sarett 
application.370 The court said that “we are concerned only with what this patent 
claims”371 in determining the invention and found that the difference in the claims were 
“were more than enough to convince us that ‘patentable distinction’ exists” between the 
claims of the Sarett Application and the Arth Patent.372 Although Sarett shows that the 
CCPA only considered the claims rather than embodiment, because the case involves 
related, but not identical parties, it does not constitute precedent against the argument in 
this article that a genus patent to one inventor and a subsequent application for a species 
patent within the scope of the genus to the same inventor constitutes improper double 
patenting. 
¶114 In 1966 in In re Walles,373 the CCPA essentially removed same invention type 
double patenting when it held that claimed subject matter in two patents (or a patent and 
patent application) had to be identical for there to be double patenting, in spite of the 
Supreme Court’s statement in Miller that there could be the same invention even though 
“the terms of the claim may differ.”374 Walles involved a rejected claim defining a resin 
per se and an earlier patent for a hair setting composition which contained the resin 
identified in the claims of the later patent, and applicants who were the same as the 
holders of the earlier patent.375 The court said that the “term same ‘invention’ is too broad 
a term to fit in with the law of double patenting, because of the diversity of meanings of 
‘invention,’” quoting not Supreme Court cases but a 1933 text for authority.376 The 
CCPA explained, “We may not ignore or discard any portions of the claimed subject 
 
366 One application was filed by appellant Sarett (the Sarett application) and one application 
(which became a patent) was filed jointly by Arth, Poos and Sarett (the Arth patent). Id. at 1010. Since the 
Sarett application and what became the Arth Patent were filed on the same day in 1951, neither application 
nor the patent could have been prior art. Id. at 1007. 
367 The court noted, “No simple relationship exists between the claims of Arth et al. and appellant's 
claims. Some of appellant's claims are more specific, some more generic to those of Arth et al. Some are 
hybrid.” Id. at 1012.   
  368 Id. at 1005, 1009. 
369 Id. at 1008, 1010. 
370 Id. at 1010 (“We will not at this point go into the reasoning of the Patent Office, which in 
essence asks us to ignore specific process step limitations in the patent claims on the ground that they are 
‘conventional’ steps.”). Also, compare claim 8 of the Sarett Application, id. at 1006, with claim 9 of the 
Arth Patent, id. at 1008. 
371 Id. at 1007. 
372 Id. at 1016. The court cited these differences in the claim rather than considering the 
embodiments disclosed in the specification: “each of the appealed claims defines an oxidation with Sarett’s 
specific oxidizing agent followed by a conventional ‘recovery’ of any desired and undefined kind. Patent 
claims 10 and 12 by contrast define five-step processes involving isomerization of one of the recovered 
products as in the case of claim 11, fully discussed above.” Id.  
373 In re Walles, 366 F.2d 786, 791–92 (C.C.P.A. 1966). 
374 151 U.S. at 198. 
375 366 F.2d at 787–88. The rejected application resulted from a division of a parent case, from 
which the patent was also based, so the earlier patent was not prior art. Id. at 787. 
376 Id. at 789 (quoting STRINGHAM ON DOUBLE PATENTING). 
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matter.”377 The court added it had “to determine independently precisely what subject 
matter is defined in the two sets of claims,” disregarding the specifications.378 
¶115 Seeming to suggest—incorrectly—that case law on double patenting before the 
Patent Act of 1952 was irrelevant, the CCPA in Walles said, “Whatever meaning the term 
‘invention’ may have possessed prior to the 1952 Patent Act, it is clear that the term 
‘invention’ now means the subject matter which the applicant claims and regards as his 
‘invention.’”379 Subsequent Federal Circuit cases have similarly limited same-invention 
type double patenting to identically claimed subject matter.380 As set forth above, 
however, after the passage of the Patent Act of 1952, the Supreme Court in Pfaff 
recognized that the “invention” arose before and independently of the claim, so the Patent 
Act of 1952 did not limit “invention” to the claim. 381 Moreover, the Federal Circuit in 
such cases as Ariad limited the patentable invention to the scope of the invention 
disclosed in the specification.382 Finally, the sparse legislative history in the Patent Act of 
1952 did not suggest any change in the definition of “invention.”383 
¶116 Under the narrow standard in Walles, a skilled draftsman could avoid a same 
invention type double patenting challenge to a second patent application by adding a 
minor limitation to a claim, or in other words, by slightly narrowing the scope of the 
original patent.384 Only considering the claims as the invention effectively makes same 
invention type double patenting a dead letter.  In Ariad, the Federal Circuit rejected the 
idea that claims reflected the invention, saying “the principal function of claims” is “to 
provide notice of the boundaries of the right to exclude and to define limits; it is not to 
describe the invention.”385 In contrast, the “written description discloses and teaches.”386 
 
377 Id. . The court held there was no double patenting and reversed the rejection of the patent 
application, saying, “Based on the facts of record, we know no theory of law concerning ‘double patenting’ 
which permits us to find that the inventions are ‘patentably indistinct.’” Id. at 791–92. 
378 Id. at 789. 
379 366 F.2d at 714. 
380 See, e.g., Sun Pharm. Ind., Ltd. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 611 F.3d 1381, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 968 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
381 Supra note 177–80 and accompanying text. 
382 598 F.3d at 1349. The applicant could draft a claim narrower than the scope disclosed in the 
invention. See also notes 162 and 171 above.  
383 Section 100(a) (pre-AIA) contained the following definition: “The term ‘invention’ means 
invention or discovery.” 35 U.S.C. § 100 (1952) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 100 (2012)). The Senate 
Report explained, “Paragraph (a) is added only to avoid repetition of the phrase ‘invention or discovery’ 
and its derivatives throughout the revised title.” S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 16 (1952). Also, the Senate Report 
explained the two clauses in § 112 mentioning invention as follows: “The clause relating to the claim is 
made a separate paragraph to emphasize the distinction between the description and the claim or definition, 
and the language is modified.” Id. at 19. This suggests an intent to consider the description in the 
specification in addition to the claim. As a result of the AIA, § 101(j) (post-AIA) now provides, “The term 
‘claimed invention’ means the subject matter defined by a claim in a patent or an application for a patent.” 
21 U.S.C. § 100 (2012). This seems to confirm that the claim shows what the inventor claims is its 
invention, whereas the specification must disclose what the invention is. 
384 The Supreme Court has cautioned against an interpretation of patent law that leaves it open to 
the vagaries of skilled drafters. See, e.g., note 33 above. 
385 598 F.3d at 1347 (emphasis added). 
386 Id.  
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It naturally follows that any embodiment of a claimed genus disclosed in the specification 
made by a third party is an infringing species of the patented invention.387 
¶117 In 1970, in Tidewater Patent Development Co. v. K.M. Kitchen,388 the Fourth 
Circuit took the approach of the Seventh Circuit in Weatherhead, in finding the 
applicable patent invalid for double patenting because the same party had received a 
patent for a genus and subsequent patent for a species within the scope of the genus.389 
Tidewater involved two patents for a permanent hair waving solution issued from 
applications which had been copending.390 Tidewater was the holder of both patents,391 
and the court noted that, if upheld, “such repetitive patenting would extend the 
effectiveness of 710 from its expiry in December 1968 to 323’s terminal date of February 
1973.”392 The Fourth Circuit in Tidewater said that double patenting could exist even if 
the claims did not mutually “read on” (infringe) each other.393 The ‘710 patent was 
“classified as a generic patent relating to hair waving, while ‘323 is designated as a 
species patent.”394 The court added, “Proof of double patenting is found in the concession 
of Tidewater that any product made under 323 would infringe 710.”395 
¶118 The court in Tidewater noted that an earlier patent granted to one party “does not 
invalidate a later patent to him for a distinct, different and separable invention whether 
generic or specific, whether an original machine or process, or both, or an improvement 
thereon which is not actually claimed or secured by the earlier patent.”396 Immediately 
preceding this statement, the court in Tidewater explained that an inventor could have 
multiple inventions, and the inventor could “secure all these inventions by a single 
patent,” referring to multiple claims in a single patent application rather than two patents 
or a patent and patent application as discussed in this article.397 On the issue of two 
patents, the court in Tidewater concluded that “the species patent must fall if within the 
coverage of the genus patent.”398 
 
387 Pfaff, 525 U.S. 55 at 57–58.  
388 371 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1967). 
389 Id. at 1012–13. 
390 One patent application was filed June 16, 1941 and issued on December 4, 1951 as the ‘710 
patent; and the other application was filed August 13, 1949 and issued on February 28, 1956 as the ‘323 
patent, and thus the patents were copending for some period of time. Id. at 1006. Court decisions on 
whether applications that were copending could be prior art have not always been consistent. In General 
Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH, 972 F.2d 1272, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 1992), in discussing double 
patenting and two patent applications that had been copending, the court said, “[n]either is statutory ‘prior 
art’ to the other because the patent applications were copending and, further, because there can be no ‘prior 
invention by another’ (cf. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)) because both are the inventions of Zosel.” On the other 
hand, in In re Fong, 378 F.2d 977, 980 (C.C.P.A. 1967), the CCPA said, “We must reject the premise that 
common ownership and co-pendency in themselves necessarily preclude consideration of a patent as a part 
of the prior art.” 
391 371 F.2d at 1006. 
392 Id. at 1011. 
393 Id. at 1009 (quoting In re Zickendraht, 319 F.2d 225, 229 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (“Double patenting 
may exist even where, as here, the claims in two cases are not mutually cross-readable.”)). 
394 371 F.2d at 1006. 
395 Id. at 1009. The court reversed the finding of infringement. Id. at 1013.  
396 Id. at 1010 (quoting Remington Rand BusinessBus. Serv., Inc. v. Acme Card SystemSys. Co., 
71 F.2d 628, 633–34 (4th Cir. 1934)). 
397 Id. 
398 371 F.2d at 1011. 
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¶119 Chisum argues that the opinion in Tidewater is “contrary to the accepted notion that 
an inventor may obtain a patent on a later nonobvious improvement,” citing the statement 
by the Supreme Court in Morse: “Nor can its [the second patent to the inventor] validity 
be impeached upon the ground that it is an improvement upon a former invention, for 
which the patentee had himself already obtained a patent.”399 However, the fact that the 
Supreme Court in Morse recognized that an inventor who already held a patent could 
obtain a patent for some improvements does not suggest that the inventor could obtain 
patents for all improvements. Indeed the paragraph from Morse that Chisum quoted 
concluded by saying, “All that the law requires of him is that he shall not claim as new, 
what is covered by a former invention, whether made by himself or any other person.”400 
¶120 A review of the Supreme Court’s discussion of Morse’s separate patent for local 
circuits401 indicates that the patent for an improvement in local circuits was not within the 
scope of the earlier invention, 402 so there was no reason Morse could not also patent the 
local circuits, since the eighth claim in Morse was invalidated.403 The Court in Morse said 
that if the eighth claim (for all uses of electro-magnetism to transport messages over a 
distance) could have been sustained, Morse’s subsequent patent for local circuits would 
have been “illegal and void.”404  The Court explained that Morse “could not take out a 
subsequent patent for a portion of his [eighth claim] . . .  and thereby extend his 
monopoly beyond the period limited by law.”405  The Court was saying that the same 
inventor could not obtain a patent on an improvement to a genus patent if in fact the 
inventor’s genus patent was broad enough that it covered the improvement. The decision 
in Morse, in other words, is not a basis for challenging the decision in Tidewater. 
¶121 In 1968, the CCPA in In re Schneller406 followed the positions of the Seventh 
Circuit in Weatherhead and the Fourth Circuit in Tidewater and confirmed the 
significance of a person obtaining a patent for a genus and subsequently applying for a 
species patent within the scope of the genus.407 The court said that the “fundamental 
reason” for the rule against double patenting was “to prevent unjustified timewise 
extension of the right to exclude granted by a patent no matter how the extension is 
brought about.”408  Schneller argued that his patent claimed ABCX and that his rejected 
 
399 See CHISUM, supra note 77, at vol. 3A, § 9.03[2][b][ii], p. 9-35; supra note 46. 
400 56 U.S. at 122 (emphasis added). 
401 Id. at 121, 123 (“A telegraph which prints the intelligence it conveys at different places, by 
means of the current, as it passes along on the main line, must necessarily require a different combination 
and arrangement of powers from the one that prints only at the end. The elements which compose it may all 
have been used in the former invention; but it is evident that their arrangement and combination must be 
different to produce this new effect.”) 
402 Compare claim 1 (“short local independent circuit or circuits”) and Sheets 1-4 of U.S. Patent 
No. 4,453 with claims 1-8 and sheets 1-4 of U.S. Patent No. 1,647.  
403 See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
404 56 U.S. at 114. 
405 Id.  
406 In re Schneller, 397 F.2d 350 (C.C.P.A. 1968). 
407 The patent and rejected claim were for clip systems for securing gypsum lath to supports in 
partition walls. Id. at 350–51. 
408 Id. at 354. Since there had been a division of the initial application, the court discussed § 121, 
which provides that if the USPTO determines that an application contains two or more distinct inventions 
and requires the application to be divided into two applications, the first patent granted cannot be cited as 
prior art against the second patent, unless they were independent and distinct inventions. Id. The court said, 
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application claimed ABCY.409 The court pointed out, however, that the 1960 Patent had 
used “comprising” in the transition.410 The result was that Schneller “obtained a patent 
claiming … ABCX, but so claiming these combinations as to cover them no matter what 
other feature is incorporated in them, thus covering effectively ABCXY.”411  In other 
words, the ‘329 patent was a genus patent due to the use of “comprising,” and the 
rejected claims were a species within the scope of the genus. The court took the position 
of this article in affirming the rejection of the claim as an example of double patenting, 
because the “protection he already had would be extended, albeit i[n] somewhat different 
form, for several years beyond the expiration of his patent, were we to reverse.”412 
¶122 In 1970 in contrast, in In re Vogel 413 the CCPA set a two-part test for determining 
if there was obviousness-type double patenting, which test the Federal Circuit has 
subsequently followed414 and which still focuses on a comparison of the boundaries of 
the claims rather than determining under Miller whether the earlier patent covered 
embodiments claimed in the subsequent species patent.415 The court in Vogel said the first 
part of the test was, “Is the same invention being claimed twice?”416 As in Walles,417 the 
court in Vogel said that “‘invention’ here means what is defined by the claims.”418 The 
court in Vogel then said that the second part of the obviousness-type double patenting test 
was: “Does any claim in the application define merely an obvious variation of an 
invention disclosed and claimed in the patent?”419 In making that determination, the court 
said the disclosure in the earlier patent was not prior art.420 If the second claim was 
 
“The public policy considerations underlying 35 U.S.C. 121 permit separate patents on ‘independent and 
distinct’ inventions which are initially ‘claimed in one application.’” Id. However, the court also said that 
“no such determination has been made” and added that voluntary separation of claims by the applicant 
needed to be scrutinized carefully, “because it can lead to the improper proliferation of patents on the same 
invention with the inherent result of extending timewise a patentee's right to exclude others from the 
invention disclosed in the original application and on which his patent has issued.” Id. 
409 Id. at 354. 
410 Id.  
411 Id. at 356. 
412 Id.  
413 In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438 (C.C.P.A. 1970).  
414 See In re Kaplan, 789 F.2d 1574, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1986); General Foods Corp. v. 
Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH, 972 F.2d 1272, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Hitachi Metals, Ltd., 603 Fed. 
App’x 976, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  
415 Vogel involved a patent held by Vogel claiming a method for preparing pork products and a 
patent application by Vogel claiming methods for preparing packaged meat products and for preparing beef 
products. 422 F.2d at 439–40. 
416 Id. at 441.  
417 See supra notes 373–79 and accompanying text. 
418 422 F.2d at 441. The court added that same invention meant identical subject matter and that an 
“invention defined by a claim reciting ‘halogen’ is not the same as that defined by a claim reciting 
‘chlorine,’ because the former is broader than the latter.” Id. However, it added that “claims may be 
differently worded and still define the same invention,” giving the example of a claim reciting 36 inches 
and a claim reciting three feet. Id. 
419 Id.  
420 The Federal Circuit did say that the embodiment in the specification could be used to determine 
the meaning of the words in the claims and could be helpful in deciding if the second claim would have 
been obvious, since the specification “sets forth at least one tangible embodiment within the claim, and it is 
less difficult and more meaningful to judge whether that thing has been modified in an obvious manner.” 
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merely an obvious variation of the first, then there was double patenting and that claim 
would be invalid.421 
¶123 Since Vogel was decided before Ariad, one question was apparently not raised. As 
discussed above, before Ariad a patent claim that was enabled when the application was 
filed could be “expanded” at the time of an alleged infringement to cover accused 
products that employed after-arising technologies, but not after Ariad.422 The question 
today would be, if the species within the genus was not obvious to the applicant at the 
time of the filing of the genus claim, how could he have appropriately claimed he had 
invented that species at the time of the application for the genus patent? 423 
¶124 In 1986, in In re Kaplan,424 shortly after the creation of the Federal Circuit, the 
Federal Circuit only considered the claims of the genus patent and patent claims for the 
species application (within the scope of the genus) in determining that there was no 
double patenting. Kaplan had a patent for a generic catalytic process for producing 
certain chemicals,425 and Kaplan and Walker (the Kaplan/Walker application) jointly 
filed—while the application that became the Kaplan patent was pending—a patent 
application for the preferred mode of practicing the Kaplan patent with a specific organic 
solvent.426 Due to the differences in the claims, the court held that “the same invention is 
not being claimed” in the Kaplan patent and the Kaplan/Walker application, so the court 
concluded there was no double patenting.427 Even if the Federal Circuit in Kaplan had 
considered the embodiments in the specifications in determining “invention,” however, 
the court might not have concluded there was double patenting, since the purpose of 
double patenting is to prevent the same party from extending its exclusive rights through 
a second patent.428 The court in Kaplan noted that “a sole inventor and joint inventors 
including the sole inventor are separate ‘legal entities,’ a legal proposition from which 
certain legal consequences flow.”429 Therefore, Kaplan is not precedent for one 
 
Id. at 442. However, consideration of the specification was only to determine if the second claim was 
obvious, not to determine if the earlier genus claim covered the subsequent species claim.  
421 Unless the applicant had filed a terminal disclaimer, which could “prevent undue timewise 
extension of monopoly.” Id. The last sentence of pre-AIA § 253 provides that “any patentee or applicant 
may disclaim or dedicate to the public the entire term, or any terminal part of the term, of the patent granted 
or to be granted.” 35 U.S.C. § 253 (2011). Post-AIA § 253(b) has substantially the same sentence, but there 
are certain limitations on when the courts will allow the filing of a terminal disclaimer. See infra note 464. 
422 Supra notes 223–27 and accompanying text. Also, since the genus claim literally covered the 
species, there would be no basis for applying the doctrine of equivalents to cover after-arising technology, 
even assuming the second patent was the result of after-arising technology. Supra notes 228–40. 
423 The court held that in light of the patent for preparing pork products, the rejected claim for 
preparing beef products did not constitute double patenting. Id. at 442. However, the rejected claim for 
preparing meat did constitute double patenting in light of the patent for preparing pork products. Id. at 442–
43. 
424 In re Kaplan, 789 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
425 Id. at 1574–76. 
426 Id. at 1575. The application for the Kaplan patent was filed on January 2, 1975 and granted on 
March 16, 1976. Id. at 1574. The great-great-grandparent of the Kaplan/Walker application was filed on 
September 30, 1975. Id. Both the Kaplan patent and the Kaplan/Walker application were assigned to Union 
Carbide Corporation. Id.  
427 Id. at 1581. 
428 Gilead Sci., Inc., 753 F.3d at 1212. 
429 Kaplan, 789 F.2d  at 1575. This article argues that the holder of a patent for a genus should be 
estopped from obtaining a subsequent patent for a species within the scope of the genus.   
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pharmaceutical company obtaining a broad patent on a chemical composition and then 
obtaining a patent on a species within the scope of the genus. 
¶125 In 2012 and 2014, after its en banc decision in Ariad, one might suspect that the 
Federal Circuit would change its understanding of “invention” to give more prominence 
to the specification. However, a review of two recent Federal Circuit decisions, discussed 
next, reveals that Ariad did not influence the Federal Circuit on double patenting. This 
perhaps reflects what Professor Collins has said, that “patent litigation and scholarship 
are frequently conducted within distinct doctrinal silos. Courts . . . take on disclosure 
issues (section 112, paragraph 1), functional claiming issues (section 112, paragraph 6), 
or utility issues (section 101) in isolation, assuming that each doctrine maps onto a 
distinct normative problem.”430 Such separation of Ariad’s teaching on § 112 from 
Miller’s teaching on § 101 is not warranted.431 
i) Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc. 432
No double patenting under § 101 
 
¶126 In the Federal Circuit Sandoz was unsuccessful in challenging the validity of 
Otsuka’s patent for its antipsychotic drug, marketed under the brand name Abilify®.433 
Otsuka held U.S. Patent No. 4,734,416 (the ‘416 patent), which issued on March 29, 
1988 and covered approximately nine trillion compounds,434 including a broad genus of 
compounds that generically encompassed aripiprazole, although aripiprazole was not 
specifically disclosed.435 The narrower patent allegedly infringed by the defendants was 
U.S. patent No. 5,006,528 (the ‘528 patent), issued on April 9, 1991.436 Claim 12 of the 
‘528 patent specifically claimed aripiprazole,437 the active ingredient in Abilify®.438 
 
430 Kevin Emerson Collins, An Initial Comment on Ariad: Written Description and the Baseline of 
Patent Protection for After-Arising Technology, 2010 PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 60, (2010).  
431 Anna B. Laakmann, An Explicit Policy Lever for Patent Scope, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. 
L. REV. 43, 60 (2012) (“Patent scholars observe a propensity for formalism in the Federal Circuit's patent 
jurisprudence. The court depicts patent law as an ordered system founded upon a few abstract, discrete 
categories and higher principles. It perceives each of the statutory requirements as a distinct silo, rigidly 
adhering to the notion that each substantive doctrine operates separately and independently from the 
others.”). 
432 Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
433 The ‘528 patent received a five year extension of its term under § 156 for the period of the 
FDA’s regulatory review. See Certificate Extending Patent Term Under 35 U.S.C. § 156 at p. 14 of U.S. 
Patent No. 5,006,528. See also discussion of extension of patent terms under §156 supra at notes 71-75 and 
accompanying text. With the five year term extension of the ‘528 patent for Abilify® and a six month 
period of pediatric exclusivity, the ‘528 patent was to expire on April 20, 2015. Otsuka, 678 F.3d at 1285.  
434 .Otsuka, 678 F.3d. at 1286. The ‘416 patent expired on March 29, 2005. Id. The Federal Circuit 
said the ‘416 patent constituted prior art. Id. at 1286. The court also said, “The patent principally 
underlying the double patenting rejection need not be prior art.” Id. at 1297. 
435 Otsuka Pharm. Co. Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., 2010 WL 4596324, *3 (D.N.J. 2010). The briefs of 
both parties noted that a claim of the ‘416 patent “covers” or “encompasses” aripiprazole. Id. 
436 678 F.3d at 1285. One of the inventors of the ‘416 patent was Yasuo Oshiro, who was also one 
of the inventors of the ‘528 patent. See p. 1 of the ‘416 patents. 
437 Otsuka, 2010 WL 4596324, at *4 (“Claim 12 of the ‘528 patent is directed to the compound 
aripiprazole, which has the chemical name 7–{4–[4–(2,3–dichlorophenyl)–1– piperazinyl]–butoxy}–3,4–
dihydrocarbostyril. (‘528 Patent at col. 19, lines 18–19.)”) 
438 678 F.3d at 1284-1285. 
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Otsuka’s listing for Abilify® in the FDA's Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic 
Equivalence Evaluations (the “Orange Book”) contained references to both the ‘416 
patent and the ‘528 patent as covering aripiprazole.439 
¶127 The defendants in Otsuka challenged the ‘528 patent on the grounds of (1) 
obviousness under § 103 and (2) obviousness type double patenting for one compound 
disclosed in claim 13 of the ‘416 patent.440 On obviousness type double patenting the 
Federal Circuit did not seem to consider relevant that the drug claimed in the ‘528 patent 
(aripiprazole) was within the scope of the genus claim of the ‘416 patent, or that Otsuka 
had listed both the ‘416 patent and ‘528 patent in the Orange Book as covering 
aripiprazole.441 
¶128 Instead, the Federal Circuit agreed with Otsuka and said, “In the context of claimed 
chemical compounds, an analysis of nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting—
like an analysis under § 103—entails determining, inter alia, whether one of ordinary 
skill in the art would have had reason or motivation to modify the earlier claimed 
compound to make the compound of the asserted claim with a reasonable expectation of 
success.”442 Under this test, a modified obviousness test under § 103, the Federal Circuit 
was only comparing the genus claim limits with the subsequent species claim limits.443 
¶129 The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court that there was no 
obviousness type double patenting, because “the prior art would not have provided a 
skilled artisan with a reason to make the necessary structural changes to the unsubstituted 
butoxy to yield aripiprazole.”444 The court explained that “the evidence here not only 
demonstrates the unpredictability of minor structural changes on a compound’s 
antipsychotic properties, but also indicates that the prior art would not have provided the 
 
439 Otsuka, 2010 WL 4596324 at *2. 
440 Id. at **8-28 (obviousness) and **28-29 (obviousness type double patenting). A review of the 
appellate briefs filed in the Federal Circuit reveals that the defendants did not claim the ‘416 patent 
anticipated the ‘528 patent. See 2011 WL 4735195 (C.A. Fed.), 2011 WL 4735196 (C.A. Fed.), 2011 WL 
3796762 (C.A. Fed.), 2011 WL 3796763 (C.A. Fed.), 2011 WL 1748636 (C.A. Fed.), 2011 WL 1748637 
(C.A. Fed.), 2012 WL 3597032 (C.A. Fed.), 2012 WL 2450061 (C.A. Fed.). 
441These facts were apparent in the decision, see supra notes 433-438, but the reasoning of the 
court, discussed in the next paragraph, disregarded these facts that point to double patenting. 
442 678 F.3d at 1298. In Graham v. John Deere Company of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966), the 
Supreme Court held that the “ultimate question of patent validity is one of law,” but identified “several 
basic factual inquiries: the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the 
prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art 
resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined.” 
Id. at 17. The Court added, “Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved 
needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of 
the subject matter sought to be patented.” Id. at 17–18. In KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 
(2007), the Supreme Court discussed how to weigh the various considerations for the obviousness inquiry 
set forth in Graham, focusing on predictability of results. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Predictability and 
Nonobviousness in Patent Law After KSR, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 391, 425, 393 (2014). 
See also Douglas L. Rogers, Federal Circuit’s Obviousness Test For New Pharmaceutical Compounds: 
Gobbledygook?, 14 CHI.-. KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 49 (2015); Douglas L. Rogers, Obvious Confusion Over 
Properties Discovered After a Patent Application, 43 AIPLA Q.J. 489 (2015). 
443 678 F.3d at 1297 (It “is the claims that are compared when assessing double patenting” 
(quoting Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 943 (Fed. Cir. 1992))). 
444 678 F.3d at 1299. The Federal Circuit in Otsuka also affirmed the district court’s conclusion 
that defendants failed to prove that the ‘528 patent claims at issue were obvious under § 103. See id. at 
1290–96.  
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skilled artisan with a reason to make the necessary structural changes to the unsubstituted 
butoxy to yield aripiprazole.”445 
¶130 In other words, the Federal Circuit was not taking into account the principle in 
Miller that “no patent [the ‘528 patent] can issue for an invention actually covered by a 
former patent [the ‘416 patent], especially to the same patentee, although the terms of the 
claims may differ.”446 Similarly, the Federal Circuit was not considering the Supreme 
Court’s statement in Morse that a patentee “could not take out a subsequent patent for a 
portion of his first invention [the part of the invention covered by the ‘416 patent], and 
thereby extend his monopoly [for aripiprazole] beyond the period limited by law.”447 
These historic principles remain valid today and also reflect the recent emphasis of the 
Supreme Court and patent law scholarship that patent law must achieve a balance 
between First Inventors and Improvers to promote competition for improvements.448 
¶131 The extension of the exclusive rights in Otsuka was clear, since the ‘528 patent was 
to expire on April 20, 2015, compared to the earlier expiration of the ‘416 patent on 
March 29, 2005.449 Otsuka had received the genus ‘416 patent, so the ‘416 patent was 
presumed to be valid under § 282. Under Ariad and Novozymes it should have been 
presumed that Otsuka had disclosed in the specification for the ‘416 patent sufficient 
species to support the scope of the claims, including the species on which Otsuka 
subsequently sued on the ‘528 patent.450 In Odiorne, Justice Story concluded that the 
earlier patent was “an estoppel to any future patent for the same invention,”451 and under 
§ 271(a) the patented invention includes any completed embodiment containing the 
elements of the patent claim.452 
¶132 Otsuka should have been estopped from subsequently arguing in defense of its ‘528 
patent that it wasn’t obvious and that it really hadn’t conceived of the species in the ‘528 
patent, especially since Otsuka listed in the Orange Book that both the ‘416 and ‘528 
patents covered aripiprazole. Under prosecution history estoppel, parties are estopped 
from narrowing the scope of their claims to avoid prior art and obtain a patent and 
subsequently trying to recover that abandoned scope against a defendant in infringement 
litigation through a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.453 Just as 
they do for prosecution history estoppel and assignor estoppel, the courts should reject 
the approach of a company obtaining a broad patent through its representation that it had 
invented the genus and subsequently obtaining a narrower patent on species within the 
scope of the genus patent by arguing that it had not really invented or possessed that 
species when it applied for the genus patent.454 
 
445 Id. at 1299. Earlier in the decision the Federal Circuit said that the parties had agreed that the 
‘416 patent was prior art to the ‘528 patent. Id. at 1286. 
446 Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 198 (1894). 
447 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 114 (1853). 
448 Supra, notes 49-60. 
449 678 F.3d at 1285–86. 
450 For Ariad, see supra notes 191-204 and accompanying text; for Novozymes, see supra notes 
205-12 and accompanying text, and for the presumption of validity, see supra note 217. 
451 18 F. Cas. at 579. 
452 Supra notes 181-82. 
453 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 723 (2002); 
Nard, supra note 43, at 547–48; and supra notes 219-21. 
454 A third party improver is not in the same position, since the third party has not already 
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ii) AbbVie Inc. v. Mathilda and Terence Kennedy Institute of Rheumatology Trust455
Double patenting under §101
¶133 In 2014, in AbbVie the Federal Circuit again only considered the claims and 
disregarded the actual invention. The Trust’s two separately filed patents involved 
combination therapies to treat rheumatoid arthritis with an antirheumatic drug and an 
anti-TNFà456 antibody.457 The genus patent, the‘766 patent, expired on October 8, 
2012,458 and the subsequent species patent, the ‘422 patent, was scheduled to expire on 
August 21, 2018.459 The genus patent claimed a method for co-administering rheumatoid 
arthritis treatment to all individuals in need of such treatment.460 Co-administering was 
defined to include concomitant use and adjunctive uses of the medicines.461 The species 
patent was directed to treating a smaller group of patients within the genus of patients, 
individuals with active need, and called for adjunctive use of the same medicines, one of 
the categories of the ‘766 patent for administering the medicines.462 
¶134 Focusing on the claims and a modified version of the § 103 obviousness test,463 
similar to the test it had set forth in Vogel,464 the Federal Circuit in AbbVie said, “First, 
the court ‘construes the claim[s] in the earlier patent and the claim [s] in the later patent 
and determines the differences.’ Second, the court ‘determines whether those differences 
render the claims patentably distinct.’”465 The court continued, “‘A later claim that  is not 
 
submitted an oath to the U.S. Patent Office that it had invented the species within the genus patent. 
455 AbbVie Inc. v. Mathilda and Terence Kennedy Inst. of Rheumatology, 764 F.3d 1366 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014). 
456 Tumor Necrosis Factor Alpha. Id. at 1369. The “named inventors of the ‘766  and ‘422 patents 
discovered that a protein called Tumor Necrosis Factor Alpha (TNFá) is partially responsible for the 
inflammation rheumatoid arthritis causes. This discovery led the inventors to research antibodies that block 
the TNFá protein.” Id. 
457 Id.  
458 Id.  
459 Id. at 1369. Abbvie was a licensee of the ‘766 patent but refused to enter into a license for the 
‘442 patent and sued the Trust for a declaratory judgment that the ‘422 patent was invalid. Id. at 1368. 
460 Id. at 1370. 
461 Id. at 1371. 
462 Id. at 1370.  
463 In Geneva Pharm., Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F.3d 1373, 1377, n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2003), 
the Federal Circuit said, “The distinctions between obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 and non-statutory 
double patenting include:  1. The objects of comparison are very different: Obviousness compares claimed 
subject matter to the prior art; nonstatutory double patenting compares claims in an earlier patent to claims 
in a later patent or application;  2. Obviousness requires inquiry into a motivation to modify the prior art; 
nonstatutory double patenting does not;  3. Obviousness requires inquiry into objective criteria suggesting 
non-obviousness; nonstatutory double patenting does not.” In AbbVie, the Federal Circuit acknowledged 
that part of the obviousness-type double patenting analysis was “analogous to an obviousness analysis 
under 35 U.S.C. § 103” (764 F.3d at 1378) but did not discuss or cite either of the two recent major 
obviousness decisions by the Supreme Court, Graham and KSR , discussed supra at note 441.  
464 Supra notes 410-20 and accompanying text. 
465 764 F.3d at 1374. If a patent application would otherwise involve obviousness-type double 
patenting, the problem may be solved by the applicant submitting a terminal disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. § 
253(b), so that the term of the second patent would end with the termination of the first patent. See, e.g., 
MPEP § 804.III ¶3; Gilead Sci., Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., 753 F.3d 1208, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
However, the Federal Circuit has said, “As a general rule, a terminal disclaimer filed to overcome an 
obviousness-type double patenting rejection is effective only where the application and conflicting patent 
are commonly owned.” In re Hubbell, 709 F.3d 1140, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
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patentably distinct from,’ i.e., ‘is obvious over[ ] or anticipated by,’ an earlier claim is 
invalid for obviousness-type double patenting.”466 The court added that “the nonclaim 
portion [the specification] of the earlier patent ordinarily does not qualify as prior art 
against the patentee.”467 
¶135 The Federal Circuit noted that the Trust “admits that the claims of the ‘442 patent 
are encompassed by those of the ‘766 patent,”468 or in other words, “the genus claimed in 
the ‘766 patent (treating all patients in need thereof) is broader than the species claimed 
in the ‘442 patent (treating patients with ‘active disease,’ i.e., particularly sick 
patients).”469 
¶136 The court said, “It is well-settled that a narrow species can be non-obvious and 
patent eligible despite a patent on its genus.”470 However, the court also noted that some 
species of a patented genus were not patentable separately from the genus.471 It said that 
species were not patentable apart from the genus when the “genus is so limited that a 
person of ordinary skill in the art can ‘at once envisage each member of this limited class 
. . .”472 In other words, “species are unpatentable when prior art disclosures describe the 
genus containing those species such that a person of ordinary skill in the art would be 
able to envision every member of the class.”473 The Federal Circuit held that since the 
‘442 patent did “not claim a species manifesting unexpected results” the ‘442 patent 
“would have been obvious over the ‘766 patent.” 474 
¶137 In an obviousness analysis the focus on the claims makes sense, because both pre-
AIA and post-AIA, § 103 specifically directs the court’s attention to the subject matter 
claimed.475 In contrast, § 101476 directs the court’s attention to the actual invention, such 
as a composition of matter. As set forth above,477 in Miller and Ariad the courts looked at 
the actual product disclosed in the specification—and not simply the claims—in Miller 
under § 101 to determine if one inventor had covered the same invention with two 
patents, and in Ariad under § 112 to determine the actual invention of the inventor. 
 
466 764 F.3d at 1374. 
467 Id. at 1379 (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Parenteral Meds., Inc., 689 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012)). 
468 764 F.3d at 1370. 
469 Id. at 1378. 
470 Id. at 1379 (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wash., 334 F.3d 1264, 1270 
(Fed.Cir.2003)); In re Kaplan, 789 F.2d 1574, 1577–78 (Fed.Cir.1986); In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 1014 
(1964); CHISUM, supra note 77, at vol. 3A, § 9.03[2][b][ii]. 
471 764 F.3d at 1379. 
472 Id. 
473 Id.  
474 Id. at 1381. For critiques of the Federal Circuit’s consideration of unexpected results in 
determining obviousness, see Mark A. Lemley, Expecting the Unexpected (Sept. 28, 2015) (Stanford Public 
Law, Working Paper No. 2666626), SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=2666626; Douglas Rogers, Obvious
Confusion over Properties Discovered After a Patent Application, 43 AIPLA Q.J. 489 (Fall 2015). 
475 Section 103 (pre-AIA) directs the court to determine “if the differences between the subject 
matter sought to be patented and the prior art . . . would have been obvious.” § 103 (post-AIA) directs the 
court to determine “if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the 
claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious.”  
476 Section 101 provides, “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof . . . .”  
477 Supra notes 271-302 and accompanying text for Miller; supra notes 191-204 and 
accompanying text for Ariad. 
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¶138 The outcome in Abbvie was consistent with the argument in this article that the 
double patenting prohibition should prevent a company which has obtained a genus 
patent for a pharmaceutical composition from then receiving a patent for a species within 
the genus. However, the Federal Circuit relied on the weakened double patenting doctrine 
that is essentially an alternate obviousness analysis under § 103(pre-AIA) and can fail to 
serve the purpose of the double patenting prohibition—to prevent a patentee from gaining 
an unjustified time wise extension of its exclusive rights. If Congress wants to grant 




¶139 The Federal Circuit has essentially changed the prohibition in Miller from 
consideration of the embodiments disclosed in the specification to only giving 
consideration to the boundaries of the claims as an alternate method of applying an 
obviousness analysis, generally when the earlier patents were not technically prior art 
under § 102.478 This has made it easier for skillful drafters to avoid the prohibition. Only 
considering the boundaries of the claims is an implicit rejection of the principle about the 
“invention” in Morse, Consolidated Electric, Deepsouth and Ariad. That limited 
consideration has allowed pharmaceutical manufacturers to extend the statutory period of 
exclusivity for their products beyond period specified in 35 U.S.C. 154.479 
¶140 If on the day before a genus patent were to expire, the holder of the genus patent 
obtained a patent on a species within the genus, it then would have had 40 years (minus 
one day) to exclude others from making or using that species, instead of the 20 years 
permitted by 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(2). Surely this would conflict with the principle the 
Supreme Court stated in Miller that “no patent can issue for an invention actually covered 
by a former patent, especially to the same patentee, although the terms of the claims may 
differ,”480 and the principle in Morse that an inventor “could not take out a subsequent 
patent for a portion of his first invention, and thereby extend his monopoly beyond the 
period limited by law.”481 
¶141 Under Ariad482 a party cannot obtain a patent if the specification does not 
disclose/support the scope of the patent, and once a patent is granted, that patent is 
presumed valid. It is inconsistent for an inventor, or an employer of the inventor, to 
defend against a double patenting challenge from a defendant in litigation by arguing that 
the inventor of the species patent had not possessed the species when it obtained the 
species patent. There should be a finding of double patenting when the species patent is 
within the scope of the genus patent and the same party or pharmaceutical company holds 
 
478 Supra notes 431–73 and accompanying text discussing Otsuka and Abbvie. 
479 Subject of course to the statutory adjustments permitted under 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) for delays 
“due to the failure of the PTO” and extensions permitted under § 156 for delays cause by FDA review. 
Supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text; Mueller, supra note 3, at 22–24. 
480 Miller, 151 U.S. at 198. 
481 Morse, 56 U.S. at 114. 
482 And under Morse, Consolidated Electric and Schriber-Scroth, supra notes 146-161 and 
accompanying text. 
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both patents.483 There should not be the same result if an unrelated party obtained the 
subsequent species patent, because the unrelated party would not already have submitted 
an oath to the Patent Office that it had invented the full scope of the genus. 
¶142 The next section argues that although double patenting prohibition is an obscure 
doctrine, there will be an increased need for a strengthened double patenting doctrine in 
AIA cases, because of two loopholes that give companies an incentive to remove certain 
references as prior art and/or not disclosing preferred embodiments of the genus. 
 
V. THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT INCREASES THE NEED IN SOME RESPECTS FOR A 
STRENGTHENED DOUBLE PATENTING DOCTRINE 
¶143 The AIA changes “prior art” in a number of ways. For instance, it changes the date 
for determination of whether an art reference is “prior” art from the date of the invention 
to the effective filing date of the patent application.484 This in turn means that some 
disclosures of an inventor which pre-AIA were not prior art (because the inventor could 
not disclose the invention before its invention) could in the future be prior art (since the 
inventor could disclose the invention after its invention but before the filing of a patent 
application for the invention) and cause a patent to be rejected for anticipation or 
obviousness. However, in addition to changing the date on which “prior art” is 
determined, the AIA creates a number of exceptions to prior art for a variety of 
disclosures by the inventor. 485 
¶144 Since the courts have normally only applied double patenting when the earlier 
patent was not prior art,486 and the AIA changes what constitutes prior art, there has been 
discussion about the need for the double patenting doctrine once more cases apply the 
post-AIA patent statutes.487 Professor Crouch has said, “[a]t the margins there continues 
 
483 Of course, no legal standard is without ambiguities. It might be argued that trying to determine 
whether a subsequent species patent was within the scope of an earlier genus patent would be too 
complicated, but that is a difficult argument to make convincingly. First, the Ariad standard already 
requires a comparison of the disclosure in the specification to the claim. Second, under the strengthened 
definiteness § 112 standard of Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014), the 
Supreme Court has held that patent claims “read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the 
prosecution history” must “inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the 
invention.” Even under the former definiteness standard, the courts appeared to be able to answer that 
question without any uncertainty. In Otsuka, for instance, the district court indicated that the briefs of both 
parties had noted the claims of the species patent fell within the scope of the genus patent. 2010 WL 
4596324, *3. Similarly, in AbbVie, the Federal Circuit said that the Trust admitted the claims of the genus 
‘766 patent were within the scope of the subsequent species patent. 764 F.3d at 1370. 
484 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)(2) (post-AIA). 
485 Dennis Crouch, Does Obviousness Type Double Patenting Survive the AIA? (September 23, 
2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/09/obviousness-patenting-survive.html (accessed Dec. 26, 2015) 
(such as “disclosures originating from the inventors (Section 102(b)); as well as prior patent applications 
from the same patent-owne[r] and that were still unpublished by the latter filing date (Section 
102(b)(2)(c).”).  
486 Supra Part IV(B)(2), note 316 and accompanying text.  
487 Crouch, Does Obviousness Type Double Patenting Survive the AIA?, supra note 485(“What is 
unclear is whether the courts will be willing to apply the rewritten statute in a way that eliminates old forms 
of prior art that are no longer part of the statute.”); Olga Berson, Challenging Patent Validity Under The 
AIA: Strategic And Tactical Considerations When Deciding Whether To Pursue Ex Parte Reexamination 
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to be potential for applicants to ‘play games’ with the filing system in order to extend 
their effective patent term.”488 However, he added that the “potential is so reduced from 
ages past and the statute now defines prior art at such an explicit level of detail that we 
leave little room for a judicially created doctrine that further eliminates patents.”489 Yet, 
as mentioned above, in the AIA there is now an express statutory basis for obviousness 
type double patenting, since (1) the CREATE Act of 2003 expressed the intent of 
Congress that obviousness type double patenting prohibition continue and (2) Section 
3(b)(2) of the AIA essentially incorporates the CREATE Act intent into the patent 
statutes in § 102(c) (post-AIA).490 There has been no suggestion that the prohibition on 
same invention type double patenting would change, since that is based on § 101, and § 
101 has not changed under the AIA.491 
¶145 There are at least two areas impacted by the AIA that increase the need for the 
strengthened double patenting doctrine argued for in this article. The first is the 
expansion of the ability of pharmaceutical companies to remove existing knowledge and 
references from the definition of prior art both for purposes of anticipation and 
obviousness. The second is the elimination of the “best mode” requirement as “a basis on 
which any claim of a patent may be canceled or held invalid or otherwise unenforceable . 
. .”492 
¶146 § 102(c) (post-AIA) increases the ability of pharmaceutical companies to prevent 
existing information from being considered prior art in three ways. First, whereas § 
103(c) (pre-AIA) only precluded the information identified in § 103(c) (pre-AIA) from 
being considered prior art for purposes of obviousness, under AIA § 102(b)(2) and (c) 
(post-AIA), the identified information cannot be considered prior art either for purposes 
of obviousness or anticipation.493 Second, whereas under § 103(c) (pre-AIA) the claimed 
subject matter and earlier invention had to be commonly owned at the time of the claimed 
invention, under § 102(b)(2) and (c) (post-AIA), the claimed subject matter and earlier 
invention only have to be commonly owned by the effective filing date of the claimed 
invention, which gives the pharmaceutical company additional time to remove that 
 
Or Inter Partes Review As Part Of The Overall Litigation Strategy, Aspatore 6 (November 2012), 2012 
WL 6636452, p. 6 (“While the AIA has substantially revised Section 102 and adopted a first-to-file priority 
principle for patent claims based on applications filed on or after March 16, 2013, it is commonly held that 
‘the AIA maintains the existing principle that an inventor's own work does not constitute prior art unless it 
is a public disclosure more than a year before the application filing date’”) (quoting DONALD S. CHISUM, 2 
CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.03(3)(f)); Matal, supra note 348, at 486 (“One significant feature of the legislative 
history of the CREATE Act, effectively given the force of law by section 3(b)(2) of the AIA, is its 
assurance that double-patenting rules will apply to patent-disclosure subject matter and claimed inventions 
deemed to be commonly owned pursuant to pre-AIA § 103(c).  . . . The Committee Report for the original 
CREATE Act emphasized that “[t]he doctrine of ‘obviousness-type double patenting,’ a judicial doctrine 
used by courts to prevent patentees from obtaining an unjustifiable extension of the amount of time to 
exercise a patent's right to exclude, shall apply to such patents [i.e., patents benefiting from the CREATE 
Act].”) For the legislative history of the CREATE Act, see supra note 337. 
488 Crouch, Does Obviousness Type Double Patenting Survive the AIA?, supra note 485. 
489 Id. 
490 Supra notes 345–52 and accompanying text. 
491 Supra note 172. 
492 35 U.S.C. § 282 (b)(3)(A) (post-AIA). 
493 Mueller, supra note 3, at 291–92. 
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information from prior art.494 Third, post AIA the earlier invention will not be considered 
prior art to the claimed subject matter if at the effective filing date of the claimed 
invention, the subject matter disclosed and the claimed invention were “subject to an 
obligation of assignment to the same person.”495 A strengthened double patenting 
prohibition will be an important compensating balance for this removal of certain 
references as prior art.  
¶147 Second, the effective elimination of the best mode requirement may make it routine 
for “patentees to attempt to assert both patent rights and trade secret rights for preferred 
embodiments of their invention in certain types of cases.”496 Professors Love and Seaman 
argue convincingly that this change “provides a strong incentive for inventors to include 
in current and future patent applications less detail than in applications prosecuted in 
prior decades.”497 They add, “In light of widespread dissatisfaction in the patent 
community with the level of disclosure and detail in many patents now in force, . . . any 
reform that lowers the disclosure bar is due a heavy dose of skepticism.”498 
¶148 Professors Love and Seaman even cite an article from a Baker Botts attorney 
alerting clients that “the inventor may still pursue patent protection for his or her 
invention, and seek broadly-worded patent claims covering numerous different 
implementations, while at the same time maintaining in secret (and thus keeping from the 
world) his or her best mode for practicing the invention.”499 Although the article notes 
that there would be risk with such an approach that the lowered disclosure might cause a 
court to find the disclosure defective,500 the enticement of less disclosure might cause 
companies to try such an approach and then subsequently try to patent a narrower species 
within the genus if courts do not adopt the strengthened double patenting prohibition 
argued for in this article.  
¶149 In a number of ways, therefore, the strengthened double patenting prohibition 




¶150 Patent law should promote innovation and competition not simply for so-called 
pioneer inventions such as new chemical compositions, but also for improvements to 
those compositions, such as follow-on drugs. Supporting that goal of promoting 
competition for improvements, under the double patenting prohibition announced by the 
Supreme Court in the 1800s, one inventor should not receive two patents covering the 
same invention. Unlike third parties developing an improvement to a patented product, 
the First Inventor has already submitted an oath or declaration that she invented the full 
 
494 Id. at 291. 
495 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)(C) (post-AIA). 
496 Brian J. Love & Christopher B. Seaman, Best Mode Trade Secrets, 15 YALE J. L. & TECH. 1 
(2012). Thanks to Professor Love for pointing this out to me. 
497 Id. at 15. 
498 Id.  
499 Robert L. Maier, The Big Secret of the America Invents Act, INTELL. PROP. TODAY 20 (Dec. 
2011), http://files.bakerbotts.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Maier_DEC11.pdf. 
500 Id. at n.9. 
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scope of the invention at the time of filing the application for the genus patent.501 Once 
the inventor obtains a genus patent on that composition—after that representation—the 
courts should prevent that inventor and her employer from subsequently obtaining a 
patent on a species within the genus and further excluding competition. The inventor and 
the inventor’s employer should not have a second bite at the apple and more years of 
exclusive rights. 
¶151 The rapid rise of prices for pharmaceutical products is a national problem 
threatening U.S. citizens’ access to life-saving medicines. Returning the double patenting 
prohibition to the principles announced by the Supreme Court in the 1800s would be a 
welcome return to historic values, an important step in increasing competition for 
improvements and a logical step toward constraining the rapid rise in pharmaceutical 
prices. 
¶152 Additional research is necessary to determine whether a similar estoppel argument 
should apply to the anticipation analysis under § 102 (pre-AIA and post-AIA) when an 
inventor has obtained a genus patent and subsequently applies for a patent on a species 
within the scope of the genus patent, and the genus patent is prior art. Should the inventor 
be estopped under § 102 (pre-AIA and post-AIA) from arguing that the genus patent did 
not anticipate the species and that she had not really invented the claimed species at the 

























501 See Oskar Liivak, Overclaiming is Criminal (Sept. 7, 2016), Cornell Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 16-35. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2836165 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2836165 (“Every patent applicant is required to file an oath swearing that the 
applicant is the ‘original inventor’ of the claimed subject matter.”) 
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